test(thorchain): Avalanche router deposit clear-signs; unpinned chain gated

The router pin is now (chain_id, address): an AVAX depositWithExpiry to the
live-verified Avalanche router (00dc61..f1d4) must clear-sign with
AdvancedMode OFF — the signature is ECDSA-recovered against the host-built
EIP-155 pre-image over chainId 43114, and the native amount screen shows
msg.value with the chain's ticker (AVAX). A deposit-shaped tx on a chain
with no pinned router (BSC) falls to the blind-sign gate. Report catalog:
E23 (AVAX clear-sign, with OLED capture) + E24 (unpinned-chain gate).

Author: BitHighlander

scripts/generate-test-report.py

@@ -902,6 +902,23 @@ def _arg_shown(a):
           'through to the ordinary blind-sign gate instead of being silently native-decoded — the '
           'fix for the router-spoofing / blind-sign-bypass class of attack.',
           ['Blind sign disabled (Blocked)']),
+         ('E23', 'test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit',
+          'test_deposit_with_expiry_avalanche_router',
+          'THORChain deposit on Avalanche clear-signs (per-chain router pin)',
+          'THORChain deploys its router at a DIFFERENT address on every EVM chain, so the pin is '
+          '(chain_id, address) together. Before the chain scope, only mainnet deposits ever '
+          'matched and an AVAX->ETH swap fell into the blind-sign gate. The Avalanche C-Chain '
+          'router (00dc61..f1d4) is verified live against THORChain /inbound_addresses; the '
+          'native amount screen shows msg.value with the CHAIN\'s ticker (AVAX), and the '
+          'signature is ECDSA-recovered against the host-built pre-image over chainId 43114.',
+          ['Thorchain router screen', 'AVAX amount', 'Full memo']),
+         ('E24', 'test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit',
+          'test_deposit_unpinned_chain_blind_sign_blocked',
+          'Deposit on an unpinned chain is blind-sign gated',
+          'The mainnet router ADDRESS on a chain with no pinned router (BSC) must not inherit '
+          'the deposit UX — the same address on another chain may hold unrelated attacker code. '
+          'Falls to the AdvancedMode gate; rejection is pre-UI (no frame).',
+          []),
      ]),
 
     ('R', 'Ripple (XRP)', '7.0.0',

tests/test_msg_ethereum_thorchain_deposit.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 
 
 THOR_ROUTER = "d37bbe5744d730a1d98d8dc97c42f0ca46ad7146"  # ETH THORChain router
+THOR_ROUTER_AVAX = "00dc6100103bc402d490aee3f9a5560cbd91f1d4"  # Avalanche C-Chain router
 ETH_NATIVE  = "eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee"  # sentinel for native ETH
 
 
@@ -137,6 +138,75 @@ def test_deposit_with_expiry_non_thor_address_blind_sign_blocked(self):
                 data=data,
             )
 
+    def test_deposit_with_expiry_avalanche_router(self):
+        """A THORChain deposit on Avalanche clear-signs — the router pin is
+        (chain_id, address), not Ethereum-mainnet-only.
+
+        Before the per-chain pin, thor_isThorchainTx only ever matched the
+        mainnet router, so an AVAX->ETH swap fell into the AdvancedMode
+        blind-sign gate and the device returned a bare ActionCancelled. The
+        signature is ECDSA-recovered against the host-built EIP-155 pre-image,
+        so a wrong digest, chain id, or key fails — not just a shape check.
+        The native amount screen shows msg.value with the CHAIN's ticker
+        (AVAX), never the mainnet pseudo-token's ETH label.
+        """
+        self.requires_fullFeature()
+        self.requires_firmware("7.15.0")
+        self.setup_mnemonic_allallall()
+
+        from keepkeylib.signed_metadata import eth_sighash_legacy, keccak256
+
+        memo = "=:ETH.ETH:0xabcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12:0:t:0"
+        data = _build_deposit_with_expiry_calldata(memo)
+
+        n = parse_path("m/44'/60'/0'/0/0")
+        nonce, gas_price, gas_limit = 4, 50000000000, 300000
+        to = binascii.unhexlify(THOR_ROUTER_AVAX)
+        value = 500000000000000000  # 0.5 AVAX (native = msg.value)
+        chain_id = 43114
+
+        # AdvancedMode intentionally OFF — the deposit must clear-sign.
+        sig_v, sig_r, sig_s = self.client.ethereum_sign_tx(
+            n=n, nonce=nonce, gas_price=gas_price, gas_limit=gas_limit,
+            to=to, value=value, chain_id=chain_id, data=data,
+        )
+        self.assertIn(sig_v, [2 * chain_id + 35, 2 * chain_id + 36])
+        digest = eth_sighash_legacy(nonce, gas_price, gas_limit, to, value,
+                                    data, chain_id)
+        from ecdsa import VerifyingKey, SECP256k1, util
+        rec = sig_v - (35 + 2 * chain_id)
+        keys = VerifyingKey.from_public_key_recovery_with_digest(
+            sig_r + sig_s, digest, SECP256k1, hashfunc=None,
+            sigdecode=util.sigdecode_string,
+        )
+        signer = keccak256(keys[rec].to_string())[-20:]
+        self.assertEqual(signer, self.client.ethereum_get_address(n))
+
+    def test_deposit_unpinned_chain_blind_sign_blocked(self):
+        """A deposit-shaped tx on a chain with NO pinned router must fall to
+        the blind-sign gate — a router address borrowed onto an unpinned chain
+        (where it may hold attacker code) cannot inherit the deposit UX."""
+        self.requires_fullFeature()
+        self.requires_firmware("7.15.0")
+        self.setup_mnemonic_allallall()
+
+        from keepkeylib.client import CallException
+
+        memo = "=:ETH.ETH:0xabcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12:0:t:0"
+        data = _build_deposit_with_expiry_calldata(memo)
+
+        with self.assertRaises((CallException, Exception)):
+            self.client.ethereum_sign_tx(
+                n=parse_path("m/44'/60'/0'/0/0"),
+                nonce=5,
+                gas_price=50000000000,
+                gas_limit=300000,
+                to=binascii.unhexlify(THOR_ROUTER),  # real mainnet router addr
+                value=0,
+                chain_id=56,  # BSC: no pinned router
+                data=data,
+            )
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()