Context
From Vincent's review on PR #13 — the current exfiltration_git_push_non_origin rule only blocks pushes to non-origin remotes. Vincent raises three points:
- Maybe agents should never push at all. There may not be a legitimate reason for an AI agent to push code.
- "origin" is just a convention. Many developers working on forks call their remote "upstream" or something else. Filtering on the word "origin" isn't reliable.
- Force pushes should be treated differently. A force push is more destructive and should be split into its own severity level.
Discussion needed
- Is "block all pushes" too aggressive? Some agent workflows (auto-PR creation) do need to push.
- Should we switch to an allow-list model (block all pushes EXCEPT to allow-listed remotes)?
- How to handle force pushes — separate rule or higher severity within the same rule?
Origin
PR #13 review comment by @gewenyu99
Context
From Vincent's review on PR #13 — the current
exfiltration_git_push_non_originrule only blocks pushes to non-origin remotes. Vincent raises three points:Discussion needed
Origin
PR #13 review comment by @gewenyu99