diff --git a/plugins/codex/scripts/lib/git.mjs b/plugins/codex/scripts/lib/git.mjs
index 601202b8..2216ea7f 100644
--- a/plugins/codex/scripts/lib/git.mjs
+++ b/plugins/codex/scripts/lib/git.mjs
@@ -309,7 +309,24 @@ function buildAdversarialCollectionGuidance(options = {}) {
 export function createWorktree(repoRoot) {
   const ts = Date.now();
   const worktreesDir = path.join(repoRoot, ".worktrees");
+  // SECURITY (#14): if `.worktrees` already exists as a symlink, Node's recursive
+  // mkdirSync follows it and `git worktree add` would populate the symlink TARGET —
+  // a crafted repo (or a prior malicious run that did `ln -s ~/.config .worktrees`)
+  // would redirect the Codex workspace-write root into ~/.ssh, ~/.config, etc.
+  // Refuse any symlink at .worktrees, and verify the resolved path stays inside the repo.
+  if (fs.existsSync(worktreesDir) && fs.lstatSync(worktreesDir).isSymbolicLink()) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Refusing to create worktree: ${worktreesDir} is a symlink (possible sandbox-escape attempt). Remove it manually if expected.`
+    );
+  }
   fs.mkdirSync(worktreesDir, { recursive: true });
+  const realRepoRoot = fs.realpathSync(repoRoot);
+  const realWorktreesDir = fs.realpathSync(worktreesDir);
+  if (realWorktreesDir !== realRepoRoot && !realWorktreesDir.startsWith(realRepoRoot + path.sep)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Refusing to create worktree: ${worktreesDir} resolves outside the repository (to ${realWorktreesDir}).`
+    );
+  }
 
   // Ensure .worktrees/ is excluded from the target repo without modifying tracked files.
   // Use git rev-parse to resolve the real git dir (handles linked worktrees where .git is a file).
diff --git a/tests/worktree.test.mjs b/tests/worktree.test.mjs
index 51c56ccd..a9fb7dad 100644
--- a/tests/worktree.test.mjs
+++ b/tests/worktree.test.mjs
@@ -288,6 +288,31 @@ test("renderWorktreeTaskResult renders the manual-remove instructions (no destru
   }
 });
 
+// SECURITY regression (#14): a symlink at `.worktrees` must NOT be followed.
+// Without the guard, recursive mkdirSync follows the symlink and `git worktree add`
+// populates the symlink target — a crafted repo (or a prior malicious run) could
+// redirect the Codex workspace-write root into ~/.ssh / ~/.config / etc.
+test("createWorktreeSession refuses a symlink at .worktrees (no host-location redirect)", () => {
+  const { repoRoot } = createRepoWithInitialCommit();
+  const attackerDest = makeTempDir("worktree-attack-dest-");
+
+  // Plant the hostile symlink: .worktrees -> attackerDest (outside repoRoot).
+  fs.symlinkSync(attackerDest, path.join(repoRoot, ".worktrees"));
+
+  assert.throws(
+    () => createWorktreeSession(repoRoot),
+    /symlink/i,
+    "must refuse when .worktrees is a symlink"
+  );
+
+  // The attacker's destination must NOT have been populated.
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    fs.readdirSync(attackerDest),
+    [],
+    "attacker destination must remain empty (no worktree written through the symlink)"
+  );
+});
+
 // Regression: rescue changes are STAGED (getWorktreeDiff/applyWorktreePatch run
 // git add -A). The rendered inspection command must be HEAD/base-based so it
 // shows staged work — plain `git diff` shows only unstaged and could read empty,