diff --git a/crates/buzz-agent/src/auth.rs b/crates/buzz-agent/src/auth.rs
index 53b753672..5b439aa78 100644
--- a/crates/buzz-agent/src/auth.rs
+++ b/crates/buzz-agent/src/auth.rs
@@ -43,6 +43,24 @@ const BROWSER_AUTH_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
 #[async_trait]
 pub trait TokenSource: Send + Sync {
     async fn bearer(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError>;
+
+    /// Force a fresh bearer after the server rejected the current one (401).
+    ///
+    /// `rejected` is the exact access token that just got the 401. Unlike
+    /// [`bearer`](Self::bearer), which trusts the local expiry clock, this is
+    /// driven by the server's verdict: the cached token looked valid to us
+    /// (well within its local expiry) but the provider rejected it — clock
+    /// skew, server-side revocation, or a node that never saw it. The clock
+    /// therefore can't decide whether to refresh; the caller passes the
+    /// rejected token so the impl can refresh unless a concurrent caller has
+    /// *already* replaced it. Implementations must obtain a new token without
+    /// any interactive step, so a headless harness never hangs. The default
+    /// returns the existing bearer — correct for sources that can't refresh
+    /// (a static key); the caller's retry then fails terminally rather than
+    /// looping.
+    async fn refresh_now(&self, _rejected: &str) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
+        self.bearer().await
+    }
 }
 
 /// A token that never changes for the life of the process.
@@ -219,17 +237,28 @@ impl TokenSource for PkceOAuthTokenSource {
     async fn bearer(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
         let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
 
-        // 1. Cache hit, still fresh.
+        // 1. In-memory cache hit, still fresh.
         if let Some(tok) = state.as_ref() {
             if !is_expired(tok) {
                 return Ok(tok.access_token.clone());
             }
         }
 
-        // 2. Cache hit, expired, but we have a refresh token.
+        // 2. Re-read disk — another process may have refreshed already.
+        if let Some(disk_tok) = read_cache(&self.cache_path) {
+            if !is_expired(&disk_tok) {
+                let bearer = disk_tok.access_token.clone();
+                *state = Some(disk_tok);
+                return Ok(bearer);
+            }
+        }
+
+        // 3. Try refresh if we have a refresh token. Discover endpoints once
+        //    here — deliberately hoisted above the refresh-token check so the
+        //    browser flow at step 5 (which also needs them) reuses this call.
+        let endpoints = self.endpoints().await?;
         let refresh = state.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.refresh_token.clone());
         if let Some(rt) = refresh {
-            let endpoints = self.endpoints().await?;
             match self.refresh(&endpoints, &rt).await {
                 Ok(fresh) => {
                     let bearer = fresh.access_token.clone();
@@ -240,15 +269,79 @@ impl TokenSource for PkceOAuthTokenSource {
                     tracing::warn!(error = %e, "oauth refresh failed; falling back to browser flow");
                 }
             }
+
+            // 4. Re-read disk after refresh failure — another process may have won the race.
+            if let Some(disk_tok) = read_cache(&self.cache_path) {
+                if !is_expired(&disk_tok) {
+                    let bearer = disk_tok.access_token.clone();
+                    *state = Some(disk_tok);
+                    return Ok(bearer);
+                }
+            }
         }
 
-        // 3. No usable cache: full browser dance.
-        let endpoints = self.endpoints().await?;
+        // 5. No usable cache: full browser dance.
         let fresh = browser_pkce_flow(&self.http, &self.cfg, &endpoints).await?;
         let bearer = fresh.access_token.clone();
         self.save(&mut state, fresh)?;
         Ok(bearer)
     }
+
+    /// Force-refresh after a 401, never touching the browser flow.
+    ///
+    /// `rejected` is the access token the server just 401'd. Coalescing keys
+    /// off token *identity*, not the expiry clock: a 401 means the token was
+    /// rejected while it still looked locally fresh, so `is_expired()` would
+    /// say "keep it" and no grant would ever run. Instead, under the lock we
+    /// compare the current cached token to `rejected` — if they differ, a
+    /// concurrent caller (this process or a sibling) already refreshed, so we
+    /// return the new token without burning a second grant. If they still
+    /// match, this is the rejected token and we run the refresh-token grant
+    /// unconditionally. The whole check→refresh→save runs under one lock hold
+    /// so concurrent callers serialize. On any failure the refresh token is
+    /// preserved (never nulled) and the error is terminal `LlmAuth` — no
+    /// browser, no hang.
+    async fn refresh_now(&self, rejected: &str) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
+        let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
+
+        // 1. Coalesce by identity: if the cached token (in-memory, then disk)
+        //    is no longer the one the server rejected, someone already
+        //    refreshed it. Return that instead of grabbing another grant.
+        if let Some(tok) = state.as_ref() {
+            if tok.access_token != rejected {
+                return Ok(tok.access_token.clone());
+            }
+        }
+        if let Some(disk_tok) = read_cache(&self.cache_path) {
+            if disk_tok.access_token != rejected {
+                let bearer = disk_tok.access_token.clone();
+                *state = Some(disk_tok);
+                return Ok(bearer);
+            }
+        }
+
+        // 2. The cached token is still the rejected one. Run the refresh-token
+        //    grant unconditionally — the expiry clock can't be trusted here, a
+        //    locally-fresh token is exactly what got 401'd.
+        let refresh = state.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.refresh_token.clone());
+        let Some(rt) = refresh else {
+            return Err(AgentError::LlmAuth(
+                "token rejected and no refresh token available".into(),
+            ));
+        };
+        let endpoints = self.endpoints().await?;
+        match self.refresh(&endpoints, &rt).await {
+            Ok(fresh) => {
+                let bearer = fresh.access_token.clone();
+                self.save(&mut state, fresh)?;
+                Ok(bearer)
+            }
+            // 3. Refresh token is itself dead. Terminal — surfacing LlmAuth
+            //    stops the retry loop instead of falling to the browser flow,
+            //    which would hang a headless harness.
+            Err(e) => Err(AgentError::LlmAuth(format!("token refresh failed: {e}"))),
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 // ---- helpers -------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -549,4 +642,88 @@ mod tests {
         let v: Value = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"access_token":""}"#).unwrap();
         assert!(token_from_response(&v, None).is_err());
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_bearer_reuses_disk_token_after_expiry() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
+            discovery_url: "https://example.com/.well-known".into(),
+            client_id: "test-client".into(),
+            scopes: vec!["offline_access".into()],
+            cache_namespace: "test".into(),
+            cache_dir_override: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        };
+        let source = PkceOAuthTokenSource::new(cfg).unwrap();
+
+        // Expire the in-memory state.
+        {
+            let mut state = source.state.lock().await;
+            *state = Some(CachedToken {
+                access_token: "stale".into(),
+                refresh_token: None,
+                expires_at: Some(0), // long expired
+            });
+        }
+
+        // Write a valid token to disk (simulating another process refreshing).
+        let future_exp = SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+            .unwrap()
+            .as_secs()
+            + 7200;
+        let fresh_token = CachedToken {
+            access_token: "fresh-from-disk".into(),
+            refresh_token: Some("rt".into()),
+            expires_at: Some(future_exp),
+        };
+        let body = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&fresh_token).unwrap();
+        fs::write(&source.cache_path, &body).unwrap();
+
+        // bearer() should pick up the disk token without any network call.
+        let result = source.bearer().await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(result, "fresh-from-disk");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_bearer_falls_through_to_browser_when_disk_also_expired() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
+            discovery_url: "https://example.com/.well-known".into(),
+            client_id: "test-client".into(),
+            scopes: vec!["offline_access".into()],
+            cache_namespace: "test".into(),
+            cache_dir_override: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        };
+        let source = PkceOAuthTokenSource::new(cfg).unwrap();
+
+        // Expire the in-memory state.
+        {
+            let mut state = source.state.lock().await;
+            *state = Some(CachedToken {
+                access_token: "stale".into(),
+                refresh_token: None,
+                expires_at: Some(0),
+            });
+        }
+
+        // Write an expired token to disk too.
+        let expired_token = CachedToken {
+            access_token: "also-stale".into(),
+            refresh_token: None,
+            expires_at: Some(0),
+        };
+        let body = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&expired_token).unwrap();
+        fs::write(&source.cache_path, &body).unwrap();
+
+        // bearer() should fall through past the disk check.
+        // It will fail at the endpoints() discovery call since there's no server,
+        // which proves it didn't short-circuit on the expired disk token.
+        let result = source.bearer().await;
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+        let err_msg = format!("{}", result.unwrap_err());
+        assert!(
+            err_msg.contains("oauth discovery"),
+            "expected discovery error, got: {err_msg}"
+        );
+    }
 }
diff --git a/crates/buzz-agent/src/llm.rs b/crates/buzz-agent/src/llm.rs
index e1d529511..34427414b 100644
--- a/crates/buzz-agent/src/llm.rs
+++ b/crates/buzz-agent/src/llm.rs
@@ -187,7 +187,6 @@ impl Llm {
         path: &str,
         body: &Value,
     ) -> Result<Value, AgentError> {
-        let bearer = self.auth.bearer().await?;
         let (url, body_owned);
         let body_ref: &Value = match cfg.provider {
             Provider::Databricks => {
@@ -204,7 +203,25 @@ impl Llm {
                 body
             }
         };
-        post(&self.http, &url, body_ref, |r| r.bearer_auth(&bearer)).await
+
+        // A 401 or 403 can mean the local expiry clock disagreed with the
+        // server (skew, revocation, a node that never saw the token). On the
+        // first such rejection, force a refresh keyed off the rejected bearer
+        // and retry once. The guard is local to this call so an earlier turn's
+        // rejection can never suppress a later turn's legitimate retry. Both
+        // statuses map to `LlmAuth` in `post`: a 403 is indistinguishable from
+        // an expired-token 403 here, so we refresh once and let it propagate.
+        let mut bearer = self.auth.bearer().await?;
+        let mut refreshed = false;
+        loop {
+            match post(&self.http, &url, body_ref, |r| r.bearer_auth(&bearer)).await {
+                Err(AgentError::LlmAuth(_)) if !refreshed => {
+                    refreshed = true;
+                    bearer = self.auth.refresh_now(&bearer).await?;
+                }
+                result => return result,
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     /// If `err` names `/v1/responses` / "use the Responses API", latch a
@@ -803,6 +820,11 @@ where
             }
         };
         let status = resp.status();
+        // Both 401 and 403 are treated as refreshable: a 403 can mean an
+        // expired or revoked token, not just a pure authorization verdict, and
+        // the two are indistinguishable at the HTTP-status layer. The caller's
+        // retry loop keys off `LlmAuth` and refreshes once; the per-call guard
+        // bounds a pure-authz 403 to one wasted refresh before it propagates.
         if status == 401 || status == 403 {
             return Err(AgentError::LlmAuth(read_error_body(resp).await));
         }
@@ -1461,4 +1483,211 @@ mod tests {
         let v = serde_json::json!({"usage": {"output_tokens": 5}});
         assert_eq!(sum_usage(&v, &["input_tokens", "prompt_tokens"]), None);
     }
+
+    // ── one-shot refresh-on-401 in post_openai ─────────────────────────
+
+    /// A token source whose `bearer()` always hands back the same stale
+    /// token and whose `refresh_now()` mints a distinct fresh one, counting
+    /// each refresh. Lets a test assert exactly how many forced refreshes a
+    /// `post_openai` call provoked.
+    struct CountingAuth {
+        refreshes: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32,
+    }
+
+    #[async_trait::async_trait]
+    impl TokenSource for CountingAuth {
+        async fn bearer(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
+            Ok("stale".into())
+        }
+        async fn refresh_now(&self, _rejected: &str) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
+            self.refreshes
+                .fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
+            Ok("fresh".into())
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Stub that answers `reject_status` to any request carrying `Bearer
+    /// stale` and 200 to `Bearer fresh`. When `always_reject` is set it rejects
+    /// unconditionally, simulating a token the refresh can never satisfy.
+    /// Counts requests so a test can assert "one retry, not a loop".
+    async fn spawn_auth_stub(
+        always_reject: std::sync::Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool>,
+        reject_status: u16,
+    ) -> String {
+        use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
+        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+        use tokio::net::TcpListener;
+
+        let reject_line = match reject_status {
+            401 => "401 Unauthorized",
+            403 => "403 Forbidden",
+            other => panic!("unsupported reject_status {other}"),
+        };
+        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let url = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            loop {
+                let (mut sock, _) = match listener.accept().await {
+                    Ok(p) => p,
+                    Err(_) => return,
+                };
+                let always_reject = always_reject.clone();
+                tokio::spawn(async move {
+                    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+                    let mut tmp = [0u8; 4096];
+                    while !buf.windows(4).any(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n") {
+                        match sock.read(&mut tmp).await {
+                            Ok(0) | Err(_) => return,
+                            Ok(k) => buf.extend_from_slice(&tmp[..k]),
+                        }
+                    }
+                    let head = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf).to_ascii_lowercase();
+                    let stale = head.contains("authorization: bearer stale");
+                    let resp = if always_reject.load(Ordering::SeqCst) || stale {
+                        format!(
+                            "HTTP/1.1 {reject_line}\r\nContent-Length: 11\r\n\
+                             Connection: close\r\n\r\ntoken stale"
+                        )
+                    } else {
+                        let body = "{\"ok\":true}";
+                        format!(
+                            "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\n\
+                             Content-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
+                            body.len(),
+                            body,
+                        )
+                    };
+                    let _ = sock.write_all(resp.as_bytes()).await;
+                    let _ = sock.shutdown().await;
+                });
+            }
+        });
+        url
+    }
+
+    fn llm_with(auth: Arc<dyn TokenSource>) -> Llm {
+        Llm {
+            http: Client::builder()
+                .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
+                .build()
+                .unwrap(),
+            auto_upgraded: std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
+            auth,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A single 401 forces exactly one refresh, the retry with the fresh
+    /// token succeeds, and a *later* call gets its own refresh — proving the
+    /// one-shot guard is per-call, not stored on the source.
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
+    async fn post_openai_refreshes_once_per_call_on_401() {
+        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, Ordering};
+
+        let always_401 = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
+        let base = spawn_auth_stub(always_401, 401).await;
+        let auth = Arc::new(CountingAuth {
+            refreshes: AtomicU32::new(0),
+        });
+        let llm = llm_with(auth.clone());
+        let mut c = cfg(Provider::OpenAi);
+        c.base_url = base;
+
+        let out = llm
+            .post_openai(&c, "/v1/x", &json!({}))
+            .await
+            .expect("retry with fresh token should succeed");
+        assert_eq!(out, json!({ "ok": true }));
+        assert_eq!(auth.refreshes.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1, "one refresh");
+
+        // Second call's 401 must trigger its own refresh — the guard cannot
+        // be a stored flag that an earlier turn already tripped.
+        let out2 = llm.post_openai(&c, "/v1/x", &json!({})).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(out2, json!({ "ok": true }));
+        assert_eq!(
+            auth.refreshes.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
+            2,
+            "later call gets its own retry"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A persistent 401 (even the refreshed token is rejected) propagates as
+    /// `LlmAuth` after exactly one refresh — no infinite loop.
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
+    async fn post_openai_persistent_401_propagates_after_one_retry() {
+        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, Ordering};
+
+        let always_401 = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(true));
+        let base = spawn_auth_stub(always_401, 401).await;
+        let auth = Arc::new(CountingAuth {
+            refreshes: AtomicU32::new(0),
+        });
+        let llm = llm_with(auth.clone());
+        let mut c = cfg(Provider::OpenAi);
+        c.base_url = base;
+
+        let err = llm.post_openai(&c, "/v1/x", &json!({})).await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, AgentError::LlmAuth(_)), "got {err:?}");
+        assert_eq!(
+            auth.refreshes.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
+            1,
+            "exactly one refresh, then propagate"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A 403 is treated as refreshable: a persistent 403 forces exactly one
+    /// refresh-and-retry, then propagates as `LlmAuth`. Proves a revoked-token
+    /// 403 takes the same recovery path as a 401, bounded by the per-call guard.
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
+    async fn post_openai_persistent_403_propagates_after_one_retry() {
+        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, Ordering};
+
+        let always_403 = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(true));
+        let base = spawn_auth_stub(always_403, 403).await;
+        let auth = Arc::new(CountingAuth {
+            refreshes: AtomicU32::new(0),
+        });
+        let llm = llm_with(auth.clone());
+        let mut c = cfg(Provider::OpenAi);
+        c.base_url = base;
+
+        let err = llm.post_openai(&c, "/v1/x", &json!({})).await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, AgentError::LlmAuth(_)), "got {err:?}");
+        assert_eq!(
+            auth.refreshes.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
+            1,
+            "403 refreshes exactly once, then propagates"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A recoverable 403 (stale token 403s, fresh token 200s) forces exactly
+    /// one refresh and the retry succeeds — proving a 403 enters the refresh
+    /// path and a refreshed token clears it, the stale-token-403 recovery case.
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
+    async fn post_openai_refreshes_once_on_403() {
+        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, Ordering};
+
+        let always_403 = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
+        let base = spawn_auth_stub(always_403, 403).await;
+        let auth = Arc::new(CountingAuth {
+            refreshes: AtomicU32::new(0),
+        });
+        let llm = llm_with(auth.clone());
+        let mut c = cfg(Provider::OpenAi);
+        c.base_url = base;
+
+        let out = llm
+            .post_openai(&c, "/v1/x", &json!({}))
+            .await
+            .expect("retry with fresh token should clear the 403");
+        assert_eq!(out, json!({ "ok": true }));
+        assert_eq!(auth.refreshes.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1, "one refresh");
+    }
+
+    /// The default `refresh_now()` on a static source returns the static
+    /// token unchanged — a key that can't refresh still answers harmlessly.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn static_token_source_refresh_now_returns_static_token() {
+        let src = StaticTokenSource::new("static-key");
+        assert_eq!(src.refresh_now("rejected").await.unwrap(), "static-key");
+    }
 }
diff --git a/crates/buzz-agent/tests/databricks_oauth.rs b/crates/buzz-agent/tests/databricks_oauth.rs
index 25f1e120b..1ee8039a5 100644
--- a/crates/buzz-agent/tests/databricks_oauth.rs
+++ b/crates/buzz-agent/tests/databricks_oauth.rs
@@ -208,6 +208,143 @@ async fn refreshed_token_is_persisted_to_disk() {
     assert!(on_disk["expires_at"].is_u64());
 }
 
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn refresh_now_runs_grant_on_unexpired_rejected_token() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+
+    let (base, refresh_counter) = spawn_oidc().await;
+    let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
+        discovery_url: format!("{base}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"),
+        client_id: "test-client".into(),
+        scopes: vec!["a".into()],
+        cache_namespace: "databricks".into(),
+        cache_dir_override: Some(tmp.path().to_path_buf()),
+    };
+
+    // The exact 401 case this whole change exists to fix: a token that is
+    // still locally *unexpired* but the server rejected it (skew, revocation,
+    // a node that never saw it). is_expired() says "keep it", so a clock-based
+    // gate would no-op and the agent would die. refresh_now() must instead key
+    // off identity — the cached token equals the rejected one — and run the
+    // grant anyway. The stub never serves a browser flow, so a fresh token
+    // here proves the refresh-token grant ran, not the interactive path.
+    let future = SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .unwrap()
+        .as_secs()
+        + 3600;
+    let path = cache_path_for(tmp.path(), &cfg);
+    seed_cache(
+        &path,
+        json!({
+            "access_token": "rejected",
+            "refresh_token": "valid-refresh",
+            "expires_at": future,
+        }),
+    );
+
+    let src = PkceOAuthTokenSource::new(cfg).unwrap();
+    let bearer = src.refresh_now("rejected").await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(bearer, "fresh-token-1", "grant ran despite local freshness");
+    assert_eq!(refresh_counter.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1, "grant ran once");
+
+    // The refresh token was preserved (rotated, not discarded): the saved
+    // token still carries one, so a future 401 can refresh again instead of
+    // falling to the browser flow. This is the property defect #1 broke.
+    let on_disk: serde_json::Value =
+        serde_json::from_slice(&std::fs::read(&path).unwrap()).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(on_disk["access_token"], "fresh-token-1");
+    assert_eq!(on_disk["refresh_token"], "rotated-refresh");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn refresh_now_coalesces_when_another_caller_already_refreshed() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+
+    let (base, refresh_counter) = spawn_oidc().await;
+    let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
+        discovery_url: format!("{base}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"),
+        client_id: "test-client".into(),
+        scopes: vec!["a".into()],
+        cache_namespace: "databricks".into(),
+        cache_dir_override: Some(tmp.path().to_path_buf()),
+    };
+
+    // A concurrent caller already replaced the rejected token: the cached
+    // token differs from the one we hold. Coalesce by identity — return the
+    // new token without burning a second grant, so N concurrent 401s on the
+    // same stale token collapse onto one refresh. Note the cached token is
+    // *unexpired* here too, so this proves coalescing keys off identity, not
+    // the clock (which agrees with both the old and new token).
+    let future = SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .unwrap()
+        .as_secs()
+        + 3600;
+    let path = cache_path_for(tmp.path(), &cfg);
+    seed_cache(
+        &path,
+        json!({
+            "access_token": "already-refreshed",
+            "refresh_token": "rt",
+            "expires_at": future,
+        }),
+    );
+
+    let src = PkceOAuthTokenSource::new(cfg).unwrap();
+    let bearer = src.refresh_now("the-rejected-one").await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(bearer, "already-refreshed");
+    assert_eq!(
+        refresh_counter.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
+        0,
+        "no grant when a sibling already refreshed the rejected token"
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn refresh_now_without_refresh_token_is_terminal() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+
+    let (base, refresh_counter) = spawn_oidc().await;
+    let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
+        discovery_url: format!("{base}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"),
+        client_id: "test-client".into(),
+        scopes: vec!["a".into()],
+        cache_namespace: "databricks".into(),
+        cache_dir_override: Some(tmp.path().to_path_buf()),
+    };
+
+    // The rejected token is still the cached one and there's no refresh token
+    // to fall back on. refresh_now() must fail terminally (LlmAuth) rather
+    // than open a browser — the headless hang this whole change exists to
+    // prevent.
+    let path = cache_path_for(tmp.path(), &cfg);
+    seed_cache(
+        &path,
+        json!({
+            "access_token": "rejected",
+            "refresh_token": serde_json::Value::Null,
+            "expires_at": 1u64,
+        }),
+    );
+
+    let src = PkceOAuthTokenSource::new(cfg).unwrap();
+    let err = src.refresh_now("rejected").await.unwrap_err();
+    // `types::AgentError` isn't a public path; match on its Display, which
+    // prefixes `LlmAuth` variants with "llm auth:". A terminal LlmAuth (not
+    // a browser hang) is the whole point of this path.
+    let msg = err.to_string();
+    assert!(
+        msg.starts_with("llm auth:"),
+        "expected terminal LlmAuth, got: {msg}"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        refresh_counter.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
+        0,
+        "no grant attempted"
+    );
+}
+
 // ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 // ACP-level envelope regression test.
 //