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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: src/assets/YAML/default/CultureAndOrganization/Design.yaml
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* Input is escaped output is encoded appropriately using well established libraries.
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Source: OWASP Project Integration Project
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# AI support
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At this maturity level, AI can lift threat modeling from periodic workshops to a continuous activity: AI threat modeling tools generate architecture-aware threat model drafts from feature tickets and design documents before implementation starts, re-run the analysis when new tickets arrive and compare the threat model against the implemented code to surface drift between design intent and implementation (e.g. Apiiro AI Threat Modeling, commercial). The generated models require expert review, see the note on failure modes in _Conduction of simple threat modeling on technical level_.
This practice has the side effect that it trains non-security specialists to think like attackers.
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This practice has the side effect that it trains non-security specialists to spot how functionality can be misused.
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The outcomes of this stage should help lay the foundation of secure design and considerations.
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GraphQL queries are dynamically translated to SQL, Elasticsearch and NoSQL queries. Access to data is protected with basic auth set to _1234:1234_ for development purposes.
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Source: OWASP Project Integration Project
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# AI support
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Large language models can support threat modeling as a complementary tool: given an architecture description, a data flow diagram or a user story, they generate candidate threat lists (e.g. along STRIDE) and suggested mitigations, which the team then reviews, corrects and prioritizes in the workshop. Tools such as [STRIDE GPT](https://github.com/mrwadams/stride-gpt) automate this drafting step; agentic applications such as [Threat Designer](https://github.com/awslabs/threat-designer) analyze architecture diagrams and let the team refine the resulting threat model interactively; agent skills such as [tm_skills](https://github.com/izar/tm_skills) let an AI coding agent generate pytm-based threat models with data flow diagrams directly from the codebase and evaluate user stories for security-notable events.
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Be aware of the failure modes: a language model confidently fills gaps in an incomplete system description and produces threats for components that do not exist, and its output is non-deterministic (the same input yields different threat models). Validating an AI-generated threat model requires exactly the security expertise the tool seems to replace (see [Team Werewolves wins!](https://threatmodeling.dev/team-werewolves-wins/)). AI-generated threats are a starting point for the discussion, not its result. The team exercise and the shared understanding remain the core of this activity.
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risk:
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Technical related threats are discovered too late in the development and deployment process.
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