[P1] Public-endpoint hardening (unauthenticated ingest)

[thorwhalen]

The ingest endpoint is unauthenticated and hostile — treat every submission as untrusted UGC.

• Bot gate: Cloudflare Turnstile (or hCaptcha) verified server-side
• Rate limiting per-IP/origin — slowapi backed by Redis (in-memory default is per-worker, fails under multiple workers)
• Payload caps (body, screenshot bytes, field lengths)
• CORS origin allowlist + documented CSP guidance for embedders
• Server-side repo/site resolution (browser never names the target); moderation/holding state

Design: design.md (Public-endpoint hardening) · #1

[thorwhalen]

Phase 1 (#10) added the seams: origin allow-list + in-memory fixed-window rate limiter (behind a RateLimiter protocol) + screenshot size cap. Remaining (real hardening): Cloudflare Turnstile, a Redis-backed limiter (in-memory is per-worker), total-payload caps, a moderation/holding queue, and server-side repo resolution.