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@@ -11,9 +11,8 @@ description: Interdisciplinary Reading Club of Aphantasia
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We host monthly online meetings where researchers from diverse fields—including neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy—discuss recent findings, share methodologies, and explore new directions in aphantasia research.
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Here is a list of past session:
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Invited guests or speaker (abstract below)
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Here is a list of invited guests or speaker for past sessions:
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| 12th | 26th March 2025 | Edward Burns | Swansea University (UK) | Should aphantasia be viewed as a neurodevelopmental condition? |
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| 13th-one-year | 15 May 2025 | Adam Zeman | University of Edinburgh | Aphantasia in 9 chapters |
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**5th: Andrew Larner: Phantasia, aphantasia, and hyperphantasia: Empirical data and conceptual considerations**
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Within the past decade, the term “phantasia” has been increasingly used to describe the human capacity, faculty, or power of visual mental imagery, with extremes of imagery vividness characterised as “aphantasia” and “hyperphantasia”. A substantial volume of empirical research addressing these constructs has now been published, including attempts to find inductive correlates of behaviourally defined aphantasia, for example using research questionnaires and functional magnetic resonance imaging. Mental imagery has long been noted as a source of conceptual confusions but no specific conceptual analysis of the new formulation of phantasia,
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Close your eyes and visualise an apple. Most people will be able to see an apple in their mind’s eye, albeit with considerable individual differences in its vividness. Curiously, around 4% of the general population will report there is nothing there, except blackness, or at best, unclear shapes. This lack of mental imagery is called aphantasia, with a consensus amongst researchers that it should not be viewed as a neurodevelopmental condition (e.g., like autism, ADHD, dyslexia and dyspraxia). But what if aphantasia is a neurodevelopmental condition? How do we validate it? In this talk, I identify key characteristics shared across neurodevelopmental conditions, and strikingly confirm aphantasia exhibits these same traits too. This wealth of evidence, I argue, shows aphantasia should be classified as a neurodevelopmental condition. To facilitate acceptance of aphantasia as a neurodevelopmental condition, I summarise the dangers associated with rejecting this position, and highlight the many benefits this new status will bring.
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**13th: Adam Zeman: Aphantasia in 9 chapters (Adam Zeman)**
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**13th: Adam Zeman: Aphantasia in 9 chapters**
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I will give a historical, partly autobiographical, account of the recent rediscovery of visual imagery extremes and the research that has flowed from this, touching on our description of MX in 2010, the coinage of the term aphantasia in 2015, the work of the multidisciplinary Eye’s Mind Team between 2015 and 2019 and the substantial research output from groups around the world since then. I will close by considering promising future directions for research and why this topic has resonated so widely in both the lay and the scientific communities.
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