Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Report privately via GitHub's private vulnerability reporting or email alushmkr@gmail.com with steps to reproduce and impact. We aim to acknowledge within a few days.

• Credential storage. Platform and GitHub API tokens are stored in the Windows credential store (via the keyring crate), never in ~/.odin/config.yaml — the config only holds a token_key reference.

• Redaction before upload. When a snapshot is uploaded to the Odin Platform, secret-looking environment values are masked (services/redact.rs). Detection is two-layered:

  • By name: variables containing TOKEN, SECRET, PASSWORD, KEY, CREDENTIAL, AUTH, PAT, etc.
  • By value shape: GitHub tokens (ghp_/github_pat_/…), OpenAI/Anthropic sk-… keys, AWS access-key ids (AKIA…), Slack tokens, JWTs, and PEM private-key blocks — so a secret stored under a benign name is still masked.
  • PowerShell profile content is scanned line-by-line and masked the same way.

  Limits: redaction is heuristic. It won't catch a secret that has no recognizable name and no recognizable value shape (e.g. a bare high-entropy string in an unrelated variable). Review what you upload if in doubt.

• Local snapshots are never redacted — only the uploaded copy is. Local files under ~/.odin hold the full captured state; secure that directory as you would any file holding machine configuration.

• Uploads are non-destructive. A failed or rejected upload never modifies or deletes local snapshots.

Odin runs commands on your machine (package installs during restore, schtasks for scheduling, PowerShell for env changes). Review generated restore scripts (odin export) before running them, and only pair the CLI with a platform URL you trust.