Cursor/audit security hardening

[MParvin]

Note

Medium Risk
Touches authentication, path/SSRF controls, and optional engine planning/execution paths; defaults keep v2 flags off, but misconfiguration or regressions in permission checks could block legitimate tool use or leave browser/HTTP exposure if health or WS ports are bound broadly.

Overview
This PR tightens the security posture and expands operability while optionally enabling v2 planning/execution behind feature flags.

Security & safety: Docker isolation runs commands as argv (no sh -c). Filesystem/git paths use symlink-aware resolution; empty allow_paths now denies access. The HTTP tool adds SSRF-safe dialing and redirect checks. Browser WebSocket auth prefers Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: octaai.<token>, rejects empty Origin, and config saves at 0600 without logging full browser tokens. SQLite opens with WAL and busy timeout.

Engine & daemon: features.use_htn_planner, use_dag_executor, and use_capabilities wire HTN planning (with v1 fallback), pkg/executor scheduling, and the builtin capability registry. The daemon exposes --health-addr with /healthz and /readyz. CI moves to Go 1.25.x, adds make lint, a 20% coverage gate, and govulncheck; make live-test and Docker/health docs are added.

Tests & docs: Broad unit coverage (permission, browser, engine, planner, storage, tools) plus roadmap/log docs and an in-repo Firefox addon; memory is documented as TF-IDF, not vector DB.

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