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chore: remove .bak files, add requirements.txt, Dockerfile, and .env.example#1

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HaraldeRoessler:cleanup/remove-bak-add-deps
Apr 2, 2026
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chore: remove .bak files, add requirements.txt, Dockerfile, and .env.example#1
MoltyCel merged 2 commits into
MoltyCel:mainfrom
HaraldeRoessler:cleanup/remove-bak-add-deps

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@HaraldeRoessler

@HaraldeRoessler HaraldeRoessler commented Apr 1, 2026

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Summary

  • Remove 11 .bak files containing outdated code (including the old hardcoded API key mt_test_key_2026)
  • Add *.bak* to .gitignore to prevent future backup file commits
  • Add requirements.txt documenting all Python dependencies
  • Add Dockerfile for containerized deployment (Python 3.12-slim, uvicorn)
  • Add .dockerignore for clean Docker builds
  • Add .env.example documenting all required and optional environment variables

Motivation

The .bak files contained 6,900+ lines of dead code, including security-sensitive defaults from before the API key hardcoding was fixed. The project had no dependency documentation or container support, making it difficult for new contributors to set up a dev environment.

Test plan

  • Verify no runtime behavior changed (only deleted backup files and added new config files)
  • Verify docker build -t moltrust-api . succeeds
  • Verify pip install -r requirements.txt installs all needed dependencies

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

HaraldeRoessler and others added 2 commits April 1, 2026 14:41
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
chore: remove .bak files, add requirements.txt, Dockerfile, and .env.…
f7d4239 
…example

Remove 11 backup files that contained outdated code including the old
hardcoded API key. Add .bak* to .gitignore to prevent future commits.

Add requirements.txt documenting all Python dependencies, Dockerfile for
containerized deployment, .dockerignore for clean builds, and .env.example
documenting all required and optional environment variables.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
fix: add missing apscheduler dep, configurable DB_HOST, update init_d…
259a3ea 
…b.sql

Found during local testing with docker-compose:
- apscheduler is imported at startup but was missing from requirements.txt
- DB host was hardcoded to localhost, now reads DB_HOST env var
- init_db.sql schema was outdated — updated to match current codebase
  columns (agent_type, base_tx_hash, erc8004_agent_id, wallet fields,
  from_did/to_did in ratings, credentials table, api_keys, etc.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@HaraldeRoessler HaraldeRoessler mentioned this pull request Apr 1, 2026
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@HaraldeRoessler

HaraldeRoessler commented Apr 1, 2026

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Merge order

This PR should be merged first — other PRs depend on the requirements.txt and Dockerfile it introduces.

Recommended sequence: #1 → #3 → #2 → #4 → #7

All PRs have been locally tested together with docker compose up — smoke tests pass, dual-signature (Ed25519 + Dilithium) verified.

This was referenced Apr 1, 2026
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@MoltyCel

MoltyCel commented Apr 2, 2026

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Good cleanup — all 11 .bak files confirmed safe to remove, no active code affected.

One note on init_db.sql: the updated schema doesn't yet include columns added this week (public_key_hex, key_anchor_tx, key_anchor_block, swarm_seeds, trust_score_cache, swarm_graph). This is fine since init_db.sql is for fresh dev/test environments only — production DB was migrated separately. Worth aligning in a follow-up PR so new dev setups match production schema.

requirements.txt: consider pinning exact versions (== instead of >=) for better reproducibility in CI.

Merging now. Thanks Harald.

@MoltyCel MoltyCel merged commit ad1d2bc into MoltyCel:main Apr 2, 2026
@HaraldeRoessler HaraldeRoessler deleted the cleanup/remove-bak-add-deps branch May 12, 2026 00:08
MoltyCel pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2026
@HaraldeRoessler @claude
security: round-3 — CodeQL triage fixes (5 real findings + 4 dismissals)
cf78c7e 
Follow-up to commit d25e70c (SSRF). After running CodeQL default-setup
on the fork, 17 additional findings surfaced. Triage outcome:

  Already closed by earlier commits this PR:   1 (SSRF)
  False positives (dismissed via CodeQL UI):   4
  Real findings fixed in this commit:          5
  Stack-trace-exposure (deferred to design):   7

FIXES IN THIS COMMIT

  #1 [LOG SANITISATION] credit_middleware exception swallows DB password
     - app/main.py (logger.error in credit_middleware)
     `logger.error("…: %s", caller_did, e)` — the raw exception `e`
     can be an asyncpg ConnectionError whose repr() includes the
     Postgres connection string (with the password). Log only
     `type(e).__name__` instead.

  #2 [DEFENSIVE URL ENCODING] /join?ref= referrer parameter
     - app/main.py /join handler
     The redirect target is HARDCODED to https://moltrust.ch — the
     host is not user-controlled. But `f"https://moltrust.ch?ref={ref}"`
     interpolates `ref` raw, and a payload like `ref="x&malparam=…"`
     could corrupt the query string. Use `urllib.parse.quote(ref)` to
     percent-encode the value before interpolation.

  #3 [STDOUT TOKEN LEAK] telegram_hn_remind print(r.text)
     - scripts/telegram_hn_remind.py
     `print(f'Status: {r.status_code}, Response: {r.text}')` — if
     Telegram error responses ever echo the request URL (which contains
     the bot token in the path), the body lands in stdout / CI scrollback.
     Print only the status code.

  #4 [ReDoS] mpp authorization header regex
     - packages/mpp/index.js
     `auth.match(/^(?:Payment|MPP)\s+(.+)$/i)` on an unbounded header
     is polynomial-quadratic. This package is published to npm, so
     consumer servers carry the risk. Cap header at 8 KiB and use
     bounded `\s{1,8}` with a non-greedy first char.

  #5 [ReDoS] moltrust-openclaw-v2 base URL trim
     - moltrust-openclaw-v2/src/client.ts
     `.replace(/\/+$/, "")` is polynomial on pathological inputs.
     Replace with a `while (str.endsWith("/")) str = str.slice(0, -1)`
     loop, which is linear.

DISMISSED AS FALSE POSITIVES (no code change)

  #14 py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data at SPIFFE bind log
      Logs spiffe_uri, did, caller_did — none are passwords. CodeQL
      misfires on the "did" → "id" → "password" name-similarity heuristic.

  #13, #12 py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data in scripts/threadwatch.py
      Telegram bot token flows into the request URL but never into a
      logger or print() call — only to requests.post (which doesn't
      log URLs by default).

  #16 py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing in _reg_tracker
      This is in-memory rate-limit bucket-key derivation, not password
      storage. bcrypt/argon2 would be wrong here (slow + salted breaks
      the lookup). SHA-256 of the full API key is the correct primitive
      for an O(1) tracker.

EXPLICITLY DEFERRED (7 stack-trace-exposure findings)

  Multiple endpoints currently return `{"error": str(e)[:100]}` to
  callers. CodeQL flags these as info disclosure. Fixing them means
  changing the API contract — clients that parse the `error` field
  would break. This is a design call for the maintainer; deferring
  to a separate PR + discussion rather than including in this hardening
  pass.

VERIFICATION

  Python 3.12 AST parse — app/main.py + scripts/telegram_hn_remind.py
  compile cleanly. `node -c packages/mpp/index.js` clean. The TS file
  change is a syntactically-trivial loop, not type-impacting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This was referenced May 20, 2026
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@MoltyCel MoltyCel mentioned this pull request May 28, 2026
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MoltyCel pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 28, 2026
feat(openclaw-plugin): v2.0.0-alpha.2 — Re-§12-review alpha.2 blockers
bc94801 
Re-§12-Review für alpha.1 (run 2026-05-28 17:27 UTC, output
~/moltstack/reviews/20260528_172832_openclaw-plugin-v2.0.0-alpha.1_review.md)
votierte ÜBERARBEITEN. Drei neue Blocker für alpha.2 — alle in
diesem Commit adressiert.

Blocker #1 (Test-Lücke): kombinatorischer Pfad "own DID OK +
counterparty lookup fail + failOpen=true → ALLOW" war nicht getestet.
Test ergänzt in before-tool-call.test.ts.

Blocker #2 (Performance): sequenzielle Counterparty-Lookups in
before-tool-call.ts waren O(N × API-latency) — 4 DIDs × 50ms = 200ms+
Event-Loop-Block. Fix: Promise.allSettled + post-evaluation. Block-
Priority ist deterministisch (erste Counterparty im array order wins).
Own-DID-Check bleibt VOR counterparties (early-exit bei eigener
Insufficienz).

Blocker #3 (Air-Gap Lücke): die moltrust_verify / moltrust_trust_score /
moltrust_endorse Agent-Tools blieben auch bei minTrustScore=0 +
verifyOnStart=false beim Agent-Runtime registriert — LLM-Halluzinationen
konnten ungewollte DID-Lookups triggern. Neue Config-Option
`registerMoltrustTools` (default true). Wenn false: die 3 registerTool-
Calls werden geskipped, Tools sind für die LLM nicht aufrufbar. Slash-
Commands + RPC + Lifecycle-Hooks bleiben unverändert (explizite
Operator/User-Aktionen, nicht LLM-aufrufbar).

README: Privacy-Section schärft Disable-Anweisung — "Disabling
automatic outbound calls" (alt) vs neue "True air-gap mode" mit
registerMoltrustTools=false. Configuration-Beispiel zeigt neuen
Default-Wert.

Tests: 31 → 32 (1 neuer für kombinatorischen Pfad). Alle 32 grün,
tsc grün.

Re-Re-§12-Review läuft mit alpha.2-Briefing-Append vor npm publish.
This was referenced Jun 1, 2026
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MoltyCel added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2026
@MoltyCel
docs(specs): D-1 Acceptance-Gate architecture brief (design-only) (#128)
99ed910 
* docs(specs): D-1 Acceptance-Gate architecture brief (design-only)

Scope: AAE draft-04 §5 Step 1 (signature verify + signing-authority) + Step 2 (payload/schema/cty). Decisions: #1 JWS-wrapped VC submit-contract (extract blocks from verified payload; component-1 API/raw_canonical impact named); #2 did:web + did:moltrust launch (did:key follow-on); #3 resolve-and-verify with trust-tiering (trusted vs unverified_issuer, no hard-allowlist); #4 scope = steps 1+2 only (step 4 subject-binding + step 9 delegation = follow-ons). PyJWT 2.12.1 (no new dep). Canonicalization clarity: D-1 verifies JOSE-JWS bytes, not JCS raw_canonical. Open sign-off: DID-resolution depth/SSRF/caching, raw_canonical redefinition, trust-tier persistence.

* docs(specs): resolve 4 D-1 sign-off points (design-only)

1) DID-resolution SSRF/DoS = same egress-proxy as revocation_check (no new mitigation); did:web gated on proxy, D-1 LAUNCHES did:moltrust-only (no outbound, not proxy-gated). 2) raw_canonical = JWS-payload (trigger structurally unchanged); breaking submit-contract change, only smoke-rows affected. 3) trust-tier = new additive column issuer_trust_tier (trusted/unverified_issuer, analog value_source). 4) did:web VM-dereferencing = new layer (resolver gives raw DID-doc only). Phased launch: A did:moltrust-only now, B did:web when egress-proxy live.

* docs(specs): D-1 review-hardening — 4 criticals + 2 mediums resolved (design-only)

alg-confusion (explicit algorithms=[EdDSA] allowlist, never trust header alg); kid strict DID-URL validation + path-traversal/look-alike protection; canonicalization = exact b64url-decoded payload bytes (never re-serialize); submit rate-limit + per-issuer quota (PK already blocks exact replays); did:moltrust registry SPOF -> key rotation; JSON duplicate-keys reject via object_pairs_hook. Implementation contract, not architecture change.

---------

Co-authored-by: Lars Kroehl <kersten.kroehl@cryptokri.ch>
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2 participants

@HaraldeRoessler @MoltyCel