dpapi-forensic parses and decrypts untrusted DPAPI artifacts — blobs, master-key files, and credential stores extracted from compromised or actively hostile systems. Hostile input is the expected case, not an edge case. Robustness against crafted structures is a core design goal, and we take reports of crashes, hangs, or memory-safety issues seriously.

Security fixes are released against the latest published 0.1.x line.

Do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability.

Report privately, by either:

• GitHub Security Advisories — open a private advisory on the dpapi-forensic repository, or
• Email — albert@securityronin.com.

Please include:

• the affected version and target triple,
• a minimal reproducing DPAPI blob or byte buffer,
• the observed behaviour (panic, hang, excessive allocation, mis-parse) and the expected behaviour.

We aim to acknowledge a report within a few business days and to coordinate disclosure once a fix is available.

dpapi-forensic is hardened against adversarial input by construction:

• #![forbid(unsafe_code)] across the whole workspace — no unsafe, anywhere.
• Audited cryptography only — DPAPI session-key derivation and blob/cookie decryption use the RustCrypto crates (aes, aes-gcm, cbc, des, hmac, sha1, sha2); no primitive is hand-rolled. The library decrypts evidence given a key and never fabricates plausible-but-wrong output: a bad key, IV length, or HMAC surfaces as a typed error.
• Bounds-checked parsing — every length and offset in parse_dpapi_blob is validated against the actual buffer before use; out-of-range reads fall back rather than panic.
• No panics on malicious input — malformed blobs surface as a typed DpapiError, not a crash or silently-wrong plaintext.