fix: revert on invalid signature in receiveMessage to prevent griefing #1251
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This fix addresses ACP-27 where an attacker could grief users by front-running receiveMessage with valid CCTP message/attestation but an invalid signature. Previously, this would cause the transaction to succeed with fallback behavior, consuming the CCTP nonce and causing the user to lose sponsorship and custom EVM actions.
Changes:
Now when an attacker submits an invalid signature, the entire transaction reverts, preserving the CCTP nonce so the legitimate caller can still submit with the correct signature.