🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in Process invocations

[acebytes]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Command Injection risk via string-interpolated shell commands (shell("/usr/bin/which \(tool)")) and unnecessary bash wrappers (/bin/bash -c "docker system prune...").
🎯 Impact: Attackers or compromised environment variables could potentially inject arbitrary shell commands.
🔧 Fix: Replaced shell wrappers with direct Process invocation using /usr/bin/env and arguments arrays to bypass the shell completely. Properly maintained output redirection by assigning standard pipes.
✅ Verification: Tested manually by verifying Process struct setups avoid -c execution paths. Run ./scripts/test.sh to confirm no regressions.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 1709610734122831749 started by @acebytes

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