Only the latest patch release in the current minor series receives security updates.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.16.x | Yes |
| < 0.16 | No |
This table is kept honest by
scripts/check_security_policy.py, a gating CI check that fails when the supported series drifts from the package version inpyproject.tomlor when a relative link below stops resolving.
For adopter-facing deployment boundaries, data flow, artifact exposure, and hardening guidance, see the MCP Gateway Security Model. This policy remains the canonical vulnerability-reporting channel.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories. This opens a private, structured channel visible only to maintainers.
Include as much detail as possible:
- Affected version(s) and component(s)
- Steps to reproduce or a proof-of-concept
- Potential impact and suggested severity
| Milestone | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgment | Within 72 hours of report |
| Triage and severity assessment | Within 7 days |
| Fix for critical/high issues | Within 30 days |
| Fix for medium/low issues | Best-effort, next scheduled release |
We will keep you updated throughout the process and credit reporters in the release notes (unless you prefer to remain anonymous).
The following areas are in scope for security reports:
- Context firewall bypasses — raw tool output leaking into the prompt
(
src/contextweaver/context/firewall.py) - Prompt injection via tool output processing — crafted tool results that
manipulate the assembled context, bypass sensitivity filters, or defeat
sensitivity enforcement (
src/contextweaver/context/sensitivity.py) - Adapter input validation — malformed or malicious data accepted by the
MCP or A2A adapters (
src/contextweaver/adapters/) - Deserialization vulnerabilities — unsafe behavior in
to_dict/from_dictor JSON loading paths that could lead to code execution or data corruption
The following are not in scope:
- LLM behavior — how a language model interprets or acts on the context that contextweaver assembles is outside our control and not our responsibility
- Tool execution — contextweaver prepares context and routes tools; it never executes tools or makes model calls. Runtime security is the host application's responsibility
- Denial-of-service via large inputs — unless exploitable beyond resource exhaustion (i.e. leads to data leakage)
- Issues in dependencies — report these to the upstream project directly; we will update affected dependencies promptly when notified
The project runs continuous supply-chain and code-scanning automation:
- CodeQL (
.github/workflows/codeql.yml) — static analysis on every PR, onmain, and weekly. - OpenSSF Scorecard (
.github/workflows/ossf-scorecard.yml) — supply-chain health checks; results publish to the code-scanning dashboard and the README badge. - pip-audit (
.github/workflows/pip-audit.yml) — dependency vulnerability scanning (gating on core dependencies, report-only for the dev extra). - Dependabot (
.github/dependabot.yml) — weeklypipandgithub-actionsupdates. - Release integrity (
.github/workflows/publish.yml) — tag↔version gate, pre-publish tests, and signed build-provenance attestations on every release.
How findings are triaged, and how to file and document an exception for a false positive, is described in the security tooling runbook.