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Security: freducom/bloomvalley

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

Security Audit — Bloomvalley Terminal

Last updated: 2026-04-10

This document describes known security issues in the current deployment, why each matters, and how to fix it. Intended audience: anyone deploying this project or reviewing its security posture.

Context

Bloomvalley is a single-user, self-hosted personal finance terminal. It runs behind Traefik on a home network. There is no public exposure by design. The threat model is:

  • An attacker on the same LAN (or with DNS access) can reach exposed services
  • A compromised container can access secrets and other services
  • Leaked .env exposes all API keys and database credentials

Findings Summary

# Severity Finding Status
1 CRITICAL No authentication on the API REMEDIATED (2026-03-26)
2 CRITICAL Database exposed on host with weak credentials REMEDIATED (2026-04-10)
3 CRITICAL Redis exposed on host with no authentication REMEDIATED (2026-04-10)
4 CRITICAL API keys stored in plain-text .env Accepted risk
5 HIGH Backend port 8000 exposed to host REMEDIATED (2026-04-10)
6 HIGH Frontend port 3000 exposed to host Partially mitigated
7 HIGH Pipeline endpoints allow unauthenticated DoS REMEDIATED by #1
8 HIGH Analyst-swarm mounts ~/.claude credentials Accepted risk
9 MEDIUM CORS allows wildcard methods/headers Open
10 MEDIUM No request size limits REMEDIATED (2026-04-10)
11 MEDIUM No container security hardening Open
12 MEDIUM OpenInsider scraped over HTTP Open
13 LOW No Content Security Policy headers Open
14 LOW Backup SQL dump in project directory Open
15 LOW No CSRF protection Not applicable

CRITICAL

1. No authentication on the API — REMEDIATED
Status Fixed (2026-03-26). Static API key (API_KEY in .env) checked via X-API-Key header on all /api/* routes. Next.js middleware injects the header server-side — the key never reaches the browser. Cron and analyst-swarm pass the key via env var. Health endpoint exempt for Docker healthchecks.
Traefik All traffic routes through the frontend (single router). The separate backend Traefik router was removed.

2. Database exposed on host with weak default credentials — REMEDIATED
Status Fixed (2026-04-10). Host port mapping removed — PostgreSQL only reachable via Docker internal network. Password changed from warren to a 32-char random token. Existing data volume updated via ALTER USER. Access via docker compose exec -T db psql -U warren -d warren only.

3. Redis exposed on host with no authentication — REMEDIATED
Status Fixed (2026-04-10). Host port mapping removed. --requirepass added to redis-server command with a 22-char random token. REDIS_URL updated with auth credentials.

4. API keys stored in plain-text .env
Where .env — FRED_API_KEY, ALPHA_VANTAGE_API_KEY, FINNHUB_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, API_KEY, POSTGRES_PASSWORD, REDIS_PASSWORD
Risk If the host is compromised or a backup is leaked, all credentials are exposed
Status Accepted risk. Standard for self-hosted single-user deployment. .env is gitignored. For stronger posture, use Docker secrets or a secrets manager. Rotate keys periodically.

HIGH

5. Backend port 8000 exposed to host — REMEDIATED
Status Fixed (2026-04-10). Port bound to 127.0.0.1:8000 — only reachable from localhost, not from LAN. Internal Docker communication unaffected.

6. Frontend port 3000 exposed to host — PARTIALLY MITIGATED
Where docker-compose.yml — ports: "3000:3000"
Status Port remains open because Traefik routes to 172.17.0.1:3000 (host bridge IP). Cannot bind to 127.0.0.1 without moving both services to a shared Docker network. Risk mitigated by API key auth — direct port access sees the same protected API.
Future fix Join bloomvalley services to the proxy network and route via Docker DNS.

7. Pipeline endpoints allow unauthenticated DoS — REMEDIATED
Status Fixed by #1 (2026-03-26). All /api/* routes require X-API-Key header — pipeline endpoints return 401 without a valid key. The pipeline runner also prevents concurrent runs of the same pipeline (_active_runs set).

8. Analyst-swarm mounts ~/.claude credentials
Where docker-compose.yml — ${HOME}/.claude:/root/.claude and ${HOME}/.claude.json:/root/.claude.json (both backend and analyst-swarm)
Risk Claude CLI auth tokens are available inside containers. A supply-chain compromise of dependencies could exfiltrate them.
Status Accepted risk. Required for claude_cli provider (company subscription). Mounts are not read-only — Claude CLI needs write access for token refresh. Image is built locally from trusted source.
Future fix Switch to API-key auth (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var) instead of CLI token mount.

MEDIUM

9. CORS allows wildcard methods/headers
Where backend/app/main.py — allow_methods=["*"], allow_headers=["*"]
Risk If FRONTEND_URL is misconfigured or DNS is hijacked, an attacker page could make cross-origin requests with arbitrary methods/headers.
Status Open. Origin is correctly locked to FRONTEND_URL (not *). Low risk for single-origin deployment.
Fix Restrict to allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE"] and allow_headers=["Content-Type", "X-API-Key"].

10. No request size limits — REMEDIATED
Status Fixed (2026-04-10). Global 100KB body size limit via middleware (returns 413 for oversized requests). Pydantic max_length on largest fields: import paste text (50KB), research note thesis (65KB), bull/bear/base cases (10KB each), note title (500 chars).

11. No container security hardening
Where docker-compose.yml — all services run as root with full capabilities
Status Open. Low priority for a personal tool on a home network.
Fix Add security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true], cap_drop: [ALL], and user: fields where possible.

12. OpenInsider scraped over HTTP
Where backend/app/pipelines/openinsider.py:106,183 — http://openinsider.com/...
Risk Data in transit is unencrypted. A MITM could inject false insider trading data.
Status Open.
Fix Change http:// to https:// (site supports HTTPS).

LOW / INFORMATIONAL

13. No Content Security Policy headers

The frontend does not set CSP headers. Low risk for a single-user tool but good practice to prevent XSS if any user-generated content is rendered.

14. Backup SQL dump in project directory

A 20MB backup file (backup_20260323_1545.sql) exists in the project root containing all portfolio data in plain text. Should be moved outside the project directory and encrypted at rest.

15. No CSRF protection — NOT APPLICABLE

API uses header-based authentication (X-API-Key), not session cookies. CSRF attacks require cookie-based auth to be exploitable. This finding is not applicable to the current architecture.

Things that are already done right

  • SQL injection: All queries use SQLAlchemy parameterized queries or text() with named bindings
  • API authentication: Static API key (X-API-Key) on all /api/* routes, injected server-side by Next.js middleware
  • .env excluded from git: .gitignore correctly excludes .env, backend/.env, frontend/.env.local
  • Debug mode off: SQLAlchemy echo=False, no debug endpoints exposed
  • Input validation: All API endpoints use Pydantic models with type checking
  • CORS origin locked: Only FRONTEND_URL is allowed (not *)
  • External API keys loaded from env: No hardcoded credentials in source code
  • Database ports closed: PostgreSQL and Redis only reachable via Docker internal network
  • Strong credentials: Database and Redis use randomly generated passwords (32-char and 22-char)
  • Backend localhost-only: Port 8000 bound to 127.0.0.1, not accessible from LAN
  • Pipeline concurrency guard: Same pipeline cannot run concurrently (_active_runs set)
  • Request size limits: Global 100KB body limit via middleware, field-level max_length on large text inputs

Remediation History

Date Items Description
2026-03-26 #1, #7 API key middleware on all routes. Pipeline endpoints now require auth.
2026-04-10 #2, #3, #5, #10 Closed DB/Redis ports, strong passwords, backend localhost-only, request size limits.

There aren't any published security advisories