Add games from Gilboa (1997) and Jakobsen et al. (2016) to catalog

Makefile.am

@@ -232,6 +232,11 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	contrib/games/zero.nfg \
 	src/README.rst \
 	catalog/bagwell1995.efg \
+	catalog/gilboa1997/fig2.efg \
+	catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1a.efg \
+	catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1b.efg \
+	catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1c.efg \
+	catalog/jakobsen2016/fig3.efg \
 	catalog/myerson1991/fig2_1.efg \
 	catalog/myerson1991/fig4_2.efg \
 	catalog/reiley2008/fig1.efg \

catalog/gilboa1997/fig2.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+EFG 2 R "Gilboa (1997) Two-Selves Absent-Minded Driver" { "Player 1" }
+"A reformulation of the absent-minded driver problem from
+`Gil97 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Gil97>`_
+using a multi-self approach.  A chance move determines the order in which two selves act,
+each facing a binary choice.  Neither self knows the order of play, capturing absent-mindedness
+through information sets that cross the chance branches rather than through imperfect recall.
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "1" 1/2 "2" 1/2 } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "E" "B" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 0 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "B" "E" } 0
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 1 }
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 2 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "B" "E" } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "E" "B" } 0
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 4 }
+t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 1 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome 6" { 0 }

catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1a.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+EFG 2 R "Jakobsen, Sorensen, Conitzer (2016) Figure 1(a)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
+"An example from `JakSorCon16 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#JakSorCon16>`_ illustrating a game
+that is not exactly timeable.  A coin toss determines which player moves first.
+Each player guesses whether she went first, without distinguishing going first from going second.
+Each player receives a payoff of 1 for a correct guess and 0 otherwise.
+No deterministic or randomized timing can implement this game without leaking information.
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "1" 1/2 "2" 1/2 } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 1, 0 }
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 0, 0 }
+p "" 1 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 1, 1 }
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 0, 1 }
+p "" 1 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 0, 1 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome 6" { 0, 0 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 7 "Outcome 7" { 1, 1 }
+t "" 8 "Outcome 8" { 1, 0 }

catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1b.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+EFG 2 R "Jakobsen, Sorensen, Conitzer (2016) Figure 1(b)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
+"An example from `JakSorCon16 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#JakSorCon16>`_ illustrating a game
+that has an exact deterministic timing.  A coin toss determines the flow of the game;
+player 1 only plays if the coin comes up Heads, and if so plays first.
+Player 2 always plays, but cannot distinguish whether the coin came up Heads or Tails.
+Each player receives a payoff of 1 for a correct guess and 0 otherwise.
+This game can be timed by letting player 1 play at time 1 and player 2 at time 2.
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "1" 1/2 "2" 1/2 } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 0, 0 }
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 0, 1 }
+p "" 1 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 0, 1 }
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 0, 0 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 1, 1 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome 6" { 1, 0 }

catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1c.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+EFG 2 R "Jakobsen, Sorensen, Conitzer (2016) Figure 1(c)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
+"An example from `JakSorCon16 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#JakSorCon16>`_ illustrating a game
+that is not exactly timeable. A coin toss determines the order of players.
+The player moving second is only offered a bet if the player moving first guessed correctly.
+Each player receives a payoff of 1 for a correct guess and 0 otherwise.
+No deterministic or randomized timing can implement this game without leaking information.
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "1" 1/2 "2" 1/2 } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 0, 0 }
+p "" 1 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 1, 1 }
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 0, 1 }
+p "" 1 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 0, 0 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 1, 1 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome 6" { 1, 0 }

catalog/jakobsen2016/fig3.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+EFG 2 R "Jakobsen, Sorensen, Conitzer (2016) Figure 3" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" "Player 4" }
+"An example from `JakSorCon16 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#JakSorCon16>`_ illustrating
+the extensive form of an onion routing game that is not exactly timeable.
+Chance chooses a sender by drawing a signal from {0, 1, 2, 3} with equal probability.
+The sender does not make a strategic choice; only the two intermediary players act.
+For signal i:
+(a) the sender is the player whose index (mod 4) equals i,
+(b) the recipient is the player whose index (mod 4) equals i-1.
+The first intermediary is Player i+2 (mod 4) and the second is Player i+1.
+The full mapping is as follows:
+Signal 0: Player 4 sends to Player 3.  Player 2 acts first, then Player 1.
+Signal 1: Player 1 sends to Player 4.  Player 3 acts first, then Player 2.
+Signal 2: Player 2 sends to Player 1.  Player 4 acts first, then Player 3.
+Signal 3: Player 3 sends to Player 2.  Player 1 acts first, then Player 4.
+Each player has one information set with two member nodes, that is, they cannot distinguish which position they are at.
+Each intermediary chooses to either forward the envelope or obstruct by keeping it.
+Each player wants to obstruct the protocol if they are the first intermediary, but wants to help if they are the second.
+If both intermediaries forward, the message is delivered.
+In that case, the first intermediary receives -1 and the second intermediary receives 1+epsilon.
+All other players receive 0.
+If either intermediary obstructs, the message is not delivered and all players receive 0.
+With epsilon set to 0.01, the payoffs for successful delivery are:
+Signal 0: (1.01, -1, 0, 0).
+Signal 1: (0, 1.01, -1, 0).
+Signal 2: (0, 0, 1.01, -1).
+Signal 3: (-1, 0, 0, 1.01).
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "0" 1/4 "1" 1/4 "2" 1/4 "3" 1/4 } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+p "" 1 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 1.01, -1, 0, 0 }
+p "" 3 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome 6" { 0, 1.01, -1, 0 }
+p "" 4 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 7 "Outcome 7" { 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+p "" 3 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 8 "Outcome 8" { 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+t "" 9 "Outcome 9" { 0, 0, 1.01, -1 }
+p "" 1 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 10 "Outcome 10" { 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+p "" 4 1 "" { "1" "2" } 0
+t "" 11 "Outcome 11" { 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+t "" 12 "Outcome 12" { -1, 0, 0, 1.01 }

doc/biblio.rst

@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ General game theory articles and texts
 .. [Bag1995] Bagwell, K. 1995, 'Commitment and observability in games',
    *Games and Economic Behavior*, vol. 8, pp. 271-280.
 
+.. [Gil97] Gilboa, I. 1997,
+   'A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox',
+   *Games and Economic Behavior*, vol. 20, pp. 25-30.
+
 .. [Harsanyi1967a] Harsanyi, J. 1967,
    'Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players I',
    *Management Science*, vol. 14, pp. 159-182.
@@ -105,6 +109,11 @@ General game theory articles and texts
    'Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players III',
    *Management Science*, vol. 14, pp. 486-502.
 
+.. [JakSorCon16] Jakobsen, S. K, Sørensen, T. B. and Conitzer, V. 2016,
+   'Timeability of Extensive-Form Games',
+   *Proceedings of the Seventh Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference*,
+   pp. 191-199.
+
 .. [KreWil82] Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. 1982, 'Sequential equilibria',
    *Econometrica*, vol. 50, pp. 863-894.