fix(security): prevent command injection and URL protocol bypass vulnerabilities

[Aryanpatel2001]

Summary

This PR fixes three security vulnerabilities:

• URL Protocol Bypass (appIpc.ts): app:openExternal accepted any URL protocol including file://, allowing local file access
• Token Command Injection (GitHubService.ts): GitHub token passed via shell echo command, vulnerable to command injection
• Repo Delete Injection (githubIpc.ts): Repository owner/name not escaped in shell command

Changes

1. appIpc.ts - Add URL protocol whitelist (http/https only)
2. GitHubService.ts - Use spawn() with stdin instead of shell echo
3. githubIpc.ts - Use quoteShellArg() to escape repo owner/name

Testing

• pnpm run type-check passes

[vercel]

@Aryanpatel2001 is attempting to deploy a commit to the General Action Team on Vercel.

A member of the Team first needs to authorize it.

[greptile-apps]

Greptile Summary

Fixed three security vulnerabilities:

• URL Protocol Bypass: Added whitelist to only allow http/https URLs in app:openExternal
• GitHub Token Injection: Replaced shell echo with spawn() + stdin to prevent command injection during gh CLI authentication
• Repository Delete Injection: Added quoteShellArg() escaping for repo owner/name in cleanup command

The PR correctly addresses the stated vulnerabilities with appropriate fixes. However, the security review exposed similar command injection vulnerabilities in SSH connection handling code (lines 276-320 in appIpc.ts) that remain unaddressed. These involve unescaped user input in SSH commands and URL schemes for VSCode, Cursor, iTerm2, Warp, and Ghostty integrations.

Confidence Score: 2/5

• This PR has critical security vulnerabilities in SSH connection handling that must be fixed before merging
• While the PR successfully fixes the three stated vulnerabilities with proper techniques (protocol whitelist, spawn with stdin, shell escaping), the security review discovered 6 additional command injection vulnerabilities in the same file that were not addressed. These occur in SSH connection handling for VSCode/Cursor/iTerm2/Warp/Ghostty integrations where user-controlled data flows into shell commands without proper escaping
• src/main/ipc/appIpc.ts needs immediate attention - lines 276-320 contain unescaped SSH connection parameters that create command injection vectors

Important Files Changed

Filename	Overview
src/main/ipc/appIpc.ts	Added URL protocol whitelist to prevent file:// and other dangerous protocols from being opened via app:openExternal
src/main/services/GitHubService.ts	Replaced shell echo with spawn() and stdin to prevent command injection when authenticating with GitHub token
src/main/ipc/githubIpc.ts	Applied quoteShellArg() to escape repository owner/name before passing to shell command

Flowchart

%%{init: {'theme': 'neutral'}}%%
flowchart TD
    A[User Input] --> B{app:openExternal}
    B --> C[URL Protocol Validation]
    C -->|http/https| D[shell.openExternal - SAFE]
    C -->|file://, etc| E[Reject - BLOCKED]
    
    F[GitHub Token] --> G{authenticateGHCLI}
    G --> H[spawn with stdin]
    H --> I[gh auth login - SAFE]
    
    J[Repo owner/name] --> K{gh repo delete}
    K --> L[quoteShellArg]
    L --> M[execAsync - SAFE]
    
    N[SSH Connection Data] --> O{app:openInEditor}
    O --> P[VSCode/Cursor URL]
    O --> Q[Terminal SSH Commands]
    P -.->|VULNERABLE| R[Unescaped host/target]
    Q -.->|VULNERABLE| S[Unescaped username/host/target]

Loading

_{Last reviewed commit: ee8fab5}

[greptile-apps]

_{3 files reviewed, 6 comments}

_{Edit Code Review Agent Settings | Greptile}

[greptile-apps]

Additional Comments (6)

src/main/ipc/appIpc.ts
these custom URL schemes (vscode:// and cursor://) bypass the protocol whitelist you just added - an attacker could potentially inject malicious data through connection.host or target to exploit the VS Code/Cursor remote SSH handlers

              const remoteUrl = `vscode://vscode-remote/ssh-remote+${encodeURIComponent(connection.host)}${encodeURIComponent(target)}`;

---

src/main/ipc/appIpc.ts
same issue - need to encode connection.host and target

              const remoteUrl = `cursor://vscode-remote/ssh-remote+${encodeURIComponent(connection.host)}${encodeURIComponent(target)}`;

---

src/main/ipc/appIpc.ts
SSH command injection - target, connection.username, and connection.host are not properly escaped. Use the quoteShellArg() function here too

              const sshCommand = `ssh ${quoteShellArg(connection.username)}@${quoteShellArg(connection.host)} -p ${connection.port} -t "cd ${quoteShellArg(target)} && exec \\$SHELL"`;

---

src/main/ipc/appIpc.ts
same SSH command injection vulnerability here - use quoteShellArg()

              const sshCommand = `ssh ${quoteShellArg(connection.username)}@${quoteShellArg(connection.host)} -p ${connection.port} -t "cd ${quoteShellArg(target)} && exec \\$SHELL"`;

---

src/main/ipc/appIpc.ts
SSH command injection here too

              const sshCommand = `ssh ${quoteShellArg(connection.username)}@${quoteShellArg(connection.host)} -p ${connection.port} -t "cd ${quoteShellArg(target)} && exec \\$SHELL"`;

---

src/main/ipc/appIpc.ts
same SSH command injection vulnerability

              const sshCommand = `ssh ${quoteShellArg(connection.username)}@${quoteShellArg(connection.host)} -p ${connection.port} -t "cd ${quoteShellArg(target)} && exec \\$SHELL"`;