security: drop unused MINIO_* env vars from backend service#36
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The backend service had MINIO_ENDPOINT / MINIO_ACCESS_KEY / MINIO_SECRET_KEY in its env block but never read them — credentials arrive per-request in the API body and are applied to a short-lived in-memory DuckDB session. The env vars existed only as leak surface visible via 'docker inspect'. Replaced with a comment pointing readers at the new README section. Also adds a 'Credential Model' section to the README spelling out how user query credentials flow through the backend (per-request, in-memory, never persisted) and recommends Docker secrets / IAM roles for any service-level credentials self-hosters add later. Tidied up the README at the same time — removed all horizontal-rule separators since the section headings already provide the visual breaks. Closes #27
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Closes #27.
What
Why this scope
The original issue text was inherited from a CLAUDE.md note about credentials leaking via `docker inspect`. On audit that risk only exists in the commercial product (cloudfloe.com), not OSS — OSS user creds were never in env vars. So the right fix here is removing dead surface (the unused vars) and documenting the model, rather than retrofitting Docker secrets onto demo creds that are public anyway.
Verified end-to-end as a first-time user
`docker compose down -v && docker compose up --build`, then via the actual UI in a real (headless) Chrome:
Side finding (not in this PR)
During the e2e test I caught a real first-time-user bug: switching the Storage Type dropdown to MinIO sets the endpoint placeholder but not the value, so a clicker who doesn't notice the difference gets 400 from AWS. Filed as #35 — easy fix, separate scope.