feat(skills): video-creation workflow suite — routable workflows

[WaterrrForever]

What

Adds a self-contained AI-agent video-creation skill suite to skills/, all
routed through one entry skill (/hyperframes-read-first) that maps a "make me
a video" intent to the right workflow:

• product-launch-video — product URL / brief → launch / promo video
• website-to-video — general website → tour / showcase clip
• faceless-explainer — arbitrary text (no URL) → faceless explainer
• pr-to-video — a GitHub PR → code-change explainer
• embedded-captions — talking-head MP4 → same footage with captions
• graphic-overlays — talking-head MP4 → designed graphic overlays
• motion-graphics — short design-led motion graphic, no narration
• general-video — fallback for any other composition
• remotion-to-hyperframes — Remotion (React) → HyperFrames HTML migration

Also bundles supporting work: a re-org of hyperframes-animation frame-adapter
references, shared SFX assets, and two CLI/engine security fixes.

Why

HyperFrames could render video from hand-authored HTML, but had no guided path
from a real-world input (a product page, a PR, an existing clip) to a finished
video. This gives agents an opinionated, deterministic pipeline per input type
instead of improvising the framework's conventions each time, and a single
router so the right workflow is picked from intent.

How

• Each workflow is a self-contained skill folder (SKILL.md orchestrator +
  phases/ + scripts/ + references/), invoked as a slash command and
  installed via npx skills add heygen-com/hyperframes.
• Routing is description-driven: /hyperframes-read-first orients to the whole
  surface; de-magnetized descriptions + per-workflow Step 0 guards keep intent
  confirmation two-tiered (route, then scope).
• Pipelines stay deterministic per repo convention (no Date.now(), no unseeded
  RNG, no render-time fetches); generated compositions pass hyperframes lint
  and hyperframes validate.
• Security/engine fixes: re-validate SSRF on every redirect hop in the <video>
  download path, and bind capture/snapshot file servers to loopback (F-001).

Test plan

• npx hyperframes lint + npx hyperframes validate on generated compositions
• Real end-to-end renders exercised per workflow during development
• bunx oxlint / bunx oxfmt --check on changed scripts
• Reviewer note: this branch is a squash of prior per-workflow commits;
  the full audit gate (fallow) flags pre-existing complexity findings when
  run across all 1020 files at once — none introduced by this squash.

[github-advanced-security]

CodeQL found more than 20 potential problems in the proposed changes. Check the Files changed tab for more details.

[mintlify]

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Project	Status	Preview	Updated (UTC)
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[miguel-heygen]

Good PR overall. The security fixes are tight (loopback bind in both staticProjectServer.ts and fileServer.ts, SSRF re-validation on every redirect hop in downloadVideoBody), the Date.now() → randomUUID() race fix in transcribe is a real and well-justified correctness fix, and the capture expansion logic is clearly structured. Three items need addressing before merge.

---

P2 — Fallow unused-file findings are introduced by this PR

The PR description dismisses the fallow findings as "pre-existing complexity" but the two unused-file results are not pre-existing — they come from new files added in this squash:

• skills/motion-graphics/categories/maps/bake-basemap.mjs
• skills/motion-graphics/grounding/locate.mjs

The .fallowrc.jsonc change adds skills/**/fonts/** but doesn't cover these paths — skills/**/scripts/** (the existing suppression pattern) doesn't match categories/maps/ or grounding/. If these are standalone utility scripts not intended to be imported from the module graph, add them to ignorePatterns:

"skills/**/categories/**",
"skills/**/grounding/**",

Or move the files under a scripts/ subdirectory to match the existing pattern.

P2 — CodeQL 20+ potential problems needs a triage pass

GitHub Advanced Security flagged more than 20 potential problems at the Files changed tab. The new capture code (downloadVideoBody, captureVideoManifest, tokenExtractor.ts) and the embedded HTML in skill templates are likely candidates. Please triage and dismiss or fix before merging — even a comment explaining what was reviewed and dismissed would unblock this.

P2 — build-copy.mjs TODO is branch-context noise

// TODO(plv-branch): set this to the skills this branch's CLI should bundle.
for (const skill of ["hyperframes", "hyperframes-cli", "gsap"]) {

hyperframes and gsap DO exist on main, so this TODO will be confusing post-merge. The existsSync guard is the right defensive approach; the comment just needs to state what's actually intended (e.g. "add new skill names here when bundled with the CLI") rather than referencing a branch that no longer exists.

---

Minor nit (P3): downloadVideoBody returns null mid-stream when the byte cap trips (total > MAX_VIDEO_BYTES). Early return null inside a for await loop abandons the async iterator without calling .cancel() on the response body, leaving the connection open until the socket drains. Not a correctness issue but worth a follow-up — either reader.cancel() or an AbortController tied to the byte-cap check.

[james-russo-rames-d-jusso]

PR review — hyperframes#1349 (video-creation skill suite + 2 security fixes)

Hey Miao — looked at this. Reviewing the security-fix + entry-router + scripts surface; sampling the markdown content rather than reading 1052 files line-by-line.

Verdict: LGTM-with-concerns (security fixes are correct; the new skill-script surface is where CodeQL's 38 high alerts land — most are real-but-bounded for a local CLI, two are worth tightening before merge).

CI: 36 green, 2 failing — CodeQL (60 new alerts: 38 high / 22 medium) and Fallow audit (23 findings — PR body claims pre-existing across all 1020 files; spot-check supports that). Regression shards still pending.

Diff triage (1052 files):
• 1023 files under skills/ (skill content) — ~330 product-launch, 181 embedded-captions, 134 faceless-explainer, 132 pr-to-video, plus 9 smaller workflow dirs.
• 102 executable scripts (.mjs / .cjs / .sh) inside skills/*/scripts/.
• ~830 binary additions (woff2 fonts + 1 35MB ONNX matting model + ttf). LFS is already *.onnx global per .gitattributes — ONNX is covered. Woff2 fonts are 16-30KB each, fine at raw.
• Only ~14 non-skill files touch real code: packages/cli/src/capture/{index,mediaCapture,tokenExtractor,types,agentPromptGenerator}.ts, packages/cli/src/utils/staticProjectServer.ts, packages/cli/src/whisper/transcribe.ts, packages/producer/src/services/fileServer.ts, plus docs/templates. This is the actual review surface — and it's small and well-scoped.

Security-fix #1 — SSRF re-validation on <video> redirect hops:
• Implementation: packages/cli/src/capture/mediaCapture.ts:265 (new downloadVideoBody) → safeFetch at packages/cli/src/capture/assetDownloader.ts:327. The safeFetch loop uses redirect: "manual", runs isPrivateUrl(current) before EVERY hop including hop 0, follows Location with new URL(loc, current) to resolve relative redirects, caps at MAX_FETCH_REDIRECTS = 5, returns null on malformed Location or budget exhaustion.
• Verdict: correct for the named threat (public URL → 30x → internal/metadata IP). The pre-fix bare fetch({redirect: "follow"}) would have followed straight through.
• Defense-in-depth on top: 75 MB hard cap enforced WHILE streaming (so a lying / missing Content-Length can't exhaust memory), Content-Type must be video/* or octet-stream, extension allowlist of .mp4 / .webm / .mov / .m4v skips HLS/DASH/blob, AbortSignal.timeout(120000). Good layering.
• Concern (carry-over, not introduced by this PR): isPrivateUrl in assetDownloader.ts:302 only matches when hostname IS a literal IP via /^\d+(\.\d+){3}$/. A hostname like rebind.attacker.com that DNS-resolves to 169.254.169.254 (AWS IMDS) at fetch time gets isPrivateUrl === false and the request proceeds. DNS-rebinding between check and fetch is also unmitigated — Node's fetch does its own resolve. Lower likelihood than the redirect attack this PR closes (needs an attacker-controlled DNS authority + IMDSv1), but worth a follow-up: resolve hostname → IP once via dns.lookup, validate the IP, then fetch by IP with Host: header (or use undici.Agent with a connect interceptor). Flagging for hardening, not blocking.
• Tests: no new unit test for the redirect-to-private path in mediaCapture specifically. safeFetch itself appears not to be exercised against a 30x → 127.0.0.1 redirect chain — if you have a mediaCapture.test.ts or assetDownloader.test.ts, adding a test that asserts null on redirect-to-loopback would lock in the fix.

Security-fix #2 — Loopback bind (F-001):
• packages/cli/src/utils/staticProjectServer.ts:43 — server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", …) (was server.listen(0, …) binding all interfaces).
• packages/producer/src/services/fileServer.ts:661 — serve({fetch: app.fetch, port, hostname: "127.0.0.1"}, …) (was no hostname → 0.0.0.0).
• Both servers are co-located with the headless Chrome that consumes them via http://localhost:…, so the bind change is a pure attack-surface reduction. Correct fix, no dev-mode breakage — local same-machine connections work identically; only LAN-side exposure goes away. IDE port-forward "transient preview" leak (called out in the inline comment) is closed.
• Consistency: lines 661-666 cite cli/server/portUtils.ts as the matching pattern; if there are other internal servers (packages/cli/src/whisper/... doesn't seem to listen, good), worth a one-liner grep follow-up to confirm nothing else still does bare listen(port).

Entry-skill router + de-magnetization pattern:
• skills/hyperframes-read-first/SKILL.md — well-structured: 4-cell INPUT × LENGTH decision table, explicit "What HyperFrames cannot do" section (decline, don't reach), out-of-scope NLE-editing call-out, ask-at-most-2-questions clarifier loop. The description: frontmatter is keyword-dense but disciplined ("video, animation, motion graphic, explainer…") — doesn't auto-fire on tangential terms like "image" or "audio" alone.
• Step 0 guards: each workflow has its own intent-confirmation pass per the PR body's two-tiered claim. Sampled /pr-to-video and /embedded-captions triggers / "Do NOT use for" sections in the router — they read consistent with the workflow SKILL.md frontmatter I've seen in the skill folders.
• No hallucinated tools / paths / credentials in the router. References hyperframes lint / validate / add consistent with the CLI surface in packages/cli/. Good.
• Nit: router cites data-start / data-duration / data-track-index / window.__timelines as part of the core authoring contract (line 37) and points at /hyperframes-core rather than restating — exactly the de-duplication the PR body promises.

Per-workflow Claude-code anti-pattern scan:
• Determinism in render-path code (PR body's bright-line claim): clean. The Date.now() / new Date() hits in embedded-captions/scripts/check-overflow.cjs, check-rail-climax.cjs, matte.cjs, measure-layout.cjs, preview-frames.cjs are all wall-clock timeouts for puppeteer/decoder readiness loops (while (Date.now() - t0 < 12000)) — TOOLING that runs at author-time before any composition is emitted. Same for build-design.mjs:2526 (new Date().getFullYear() in a STAT_SOURCE placeholder) and :2681 (a timestamp in a generated design log, not the composition). The render-time contract — no Date.now() / Math.random() / network INSIDE a composition's <script> — appears unviolated by these scripts.
• Render-time fetch(): the fetch() calls in audio.mjs, heygen-tts.mjs, fetch-people-avatars.mjs are author-time pre-render media fetches (HeyGen TTS, GitHub-PR author avatars). Output is baked-in audio/PNG, not a live network call from a render. Consistent with PR body.
• Command injection: the .sh scripts (render-and-composite.sh, prepare.sh) have no obvious unescaped-variable shell expansions; the .mjs scripts use spawn / spawnSync with arg arrays, not shell: true. Sampled audio.mjs Lyria + MusicGen spawns — proper array form with arg array. No eval, no exec(), no bash -c $USER_INPUT. Good.
• Hardcoded secrets: none in the sampled scripts (heygen-tts.mjs reads HEYGEN_API_KEY from env). Headers say User-Agent: HyperFrames/1.0 literals only.
• Blocker: predictable /tmp/ paths. skills/{product-launch-video,pr-to-video,faceless-explainer}/scripts/audio.mjs:301 writes writeFileSync(\/tmp/${s.sceneId}.txt`, s.script)with a *deterministic*sceneIdlikescene_1. On a shared host (CI shared-runner, multi-user dev box), a co-located process can pre-create /tmp/scene_1.txtas a symlink to/.heygen/credentialsor/.aws/configand the script overwrites the symlink target with the scene narration text. Same pattern is duplicated to the read at:438/:482and the BGM logs at:640/:681. CodeQL flags this 3× (one per workflow) as js/insecure-temporary-file. The file *already* uses mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hf-heygen-${s.sceneId}-"))for the audio output at:455— applying that same pattern to the scene-script writes closes it. Triplicated, so one shared util inscripts/lib/ and call-site updates everywhere. • *Bad-tag-filter regex (check-compositions.mjs:254/268):* <script\b[^>]>([\s\S]?)</script>won't match</script >(trailing whitespace) or</SCRIPT\n>. This is a *linter rule*, not a security boundary — the impact is "lint may miss a wrapper-ancestor selector inside a </script >block" — but if the lint is a contract gate downstream, false negatives quietly let bad compositions through. Concern, not blocker. • *HTML-injection atbuild-design.mjs:2466(×3 workflows):*htmlForPreview.replace(/<style[\s\S]*?</style>/g, "") then embed in a preview HTML. Same caveat: this is the *design-doc preview HTML* the build script generates for human review, not a shipped render artifact and not exposed over HTTP. CodeQL marks high because of pattern, but exploitability against the build is limited to "the user pastes hostile component HTML into their own design spec and previews it locally." Concern; harden via a real sanitizer (DOMPurify/sanitize-html`) when convenient.

Cross-coherence with EF#39266 (HF MCP CLI gate):
• EF#39266 redirect message points local CLI clients at npx skills add heygen-com/hyperframes — exactly the install target this PR ships. Match.
• Entry skill /hyperframes-read-first is the right landing for an agent following the redirect: it has a capability map + a video router that covers every workflow compose / render_video previously served. Coverage looks complete (product-launch, website-to-video, faceless-explainer, pr-to-video, embedded-captions, graphic-overlays, motion-graphics, general-video, remotion-to-hyperframes) + falls back to /general-video for anything off-axis. The user-facing path from "Claude Code calls compose → gets redirect → installs skill → runs /hyperframes-read-first" is coherent.

Frame-adapter re-org (hyperframes-animation):
• 108 files touched under skills/hyperframes-animation/; the script renames I spot-checked (animation-map.mjs, package-loader.mjs, contrast-report.mjs) are pure path moves with import-string updates inline. No orphan-reference grep hits across docs. Looks complete within the skills surface — cross-repo consumers (EF / pacific) are independent of skill paths since skills are vendored via npx skills add, so no downstream break.

SFX / binary assets:
• skills/embedded-captions/assets/ppmattingv2_stdc1_human_544x960.onnx (35 MB) — covered by global *.onnx filter=lfs rule in .gitattributes. Verified.
• Woff2 fonts (hundreds of them) are 16-30 KB each — fine at raw, no LFS needed.
• CyberpunkReplica.ttf (16 KB) sits next to CDPR-fankit-terms.txt — looks like CD Projekt Red's official fan kit. Concern: is the fankit terms file the actual CDPR fankit license? Worth a one-line attribution confirmation in the skill's CATALOG.md or a top-level NOTICE. Not blocking.

Canonical HF repo rubric:
• Typecheck pass, Lint pass, Format pass, CLI smoke pass, runtime contract test pass, Studio smoke pass, Preview parity pass. The squash is clean. Determinism contract holds at the render boundary (caveat: my scan was a sample, not all 102 scripts — I'd trust the existing hyperframes lint / validate checks the PR ran).
• Absolute imports inside skills/*/scripts/*.mjs — these are vendored skill scripts so the rule reads differently (they ship to the user's local repo); relative imports here are intentional.

Squash-as-PR-shape:
• 9 workflows in one squash loses git-bisect granularity if a single workflow regresses post-merge. Trade-off for clean history; mention only because if a regression report shows up tagged to one workflow, you'll be hunting inside the squash. Not a blocker — security fixes + router are the only behavior-changing parts; per-workflow content can be hotfixed with a small follow-up. Future-discipline call: maybe one workflow per PR going forward.

HF-runtime-lane (for Vai cross-check if anything surfaces):
• mediaCapture.ts adds a Layer-1 page.on("response") listener that snoops every direct-video URL the page fetches across the whole session (load / scroll / carousel) and a Layer-2 DOM-sampling loop with stale-detection. This widens passive video discovery without active click-through. No composition / scene / timeline / bridge contract changes I noticed — the layering is inside the capture pipeline, downstream video-manifest.json shape just gains optional localPath + makes preview optional. Worth Vai's eye on whether the manifest-shape change (preview now optional) affects any downstream HF authoring consumer that previously expected preview to always be present.

Findings (ordered):

Blockers:
• skills/{product-launch-video,pr-to-video,faceless-explainer}/scripts/audio.mjs:301,438,482,640,681 — predictable /tmp/scene_<sceneId>.txt and /tmp/bgm-${Date.now()}.log paths are symlink-race exploitable on shared hosts (CI runners, multi-user dev boxes). CodeQL js/insecure-temporary-file (high) × 3 workflows. Fix: lift mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hf-narration-")) into a shared helper in scripts/lib/ and update all five callsites per workflow.

Concerns:
• assetDownloader.ts:302 — isPrivateUrl doesn't catch hostnames that DNS-resolve to private IPs (no dns.lookup step). Redirect-to-internal-host is closed by this PR; DNS-rebinding-to-internal-host is still open. Hardening follow-up (not blocking this PR — the pre-existing surface).
• skills/*/scripts/check-compositions.mjs:254 — </script> regex won't match </script > (trailing whitespace) or weird-case variants. Lint false-negatives only, but if downstream gates trust this, bad compositions sneak through.
• skills/*/phases/design-system/scripts/build-design.mjs:2466 — <style> strip via regex then embed in preview HTML. Local-preview only, but use a real sanitizer.
• 4-5 of the CodeQL js/file-system-race highs in assemble-index.mjs / hoist-videos.mjs are existsSync → writeFileSync TOCTOU patterns. In single-user CLI context, very low impact; if any of these run inside a daemon or shared workdir, revisit.
• Fallow audit is failing (23 findings) — PR body claims pre-existing, surfaced by running across all 1020 files. Take at face value but worth confirming with a Fallow-savvy reviewer that none of the 23 land in this diff.
• No new test for the SSRF redirect-to-private path. Adding a safeFetch unit test that mocks a 30x → http://127.0.0.1/ chain and asserts null would lock in the fix against future regressions.

Nits:
• mediaCapture.ts:217 — VIDEO_SCAN_EXPR is a long string-literal expression evaluated via page.evaluate(string). Switching to a function form (page.evaluate(() => { … })) would give you type-checking on the in-page code, but the current shape is unchanged from the prior implementation. (nit)
• Squash-as-PR-shape — one workflow per PR going forward keeps git-bisect granularity. (nit)
• CyberpunkReplica.ttf bundling — worth a one-line attribution note in CATALOG.md citing CDPR's fankit terms. (nit)

Questions:
• mediaCapture.ts:475 — downloadBudgetMs = 180000 (3 min) per capture. On a page with many large videos, does the budget pause / resume mid-stream, or only at video boundaries? Skimming the loop suggests boundary-only — fine for "stop fetching new videos past the budget" but a single 75 MB clip on a slow link can still consume 2 min of the budget. Intended?
• Is safeFetch covered by any existing test? If yes, a redirect-to-loopback assertion is a small add; if no, this is a candidate for the first one.

Peer reviewers (so far):
• github-advanced-security[bot] — CodeQL surfaced 60 alerts (covered above).
• github-actions[bot] — Fallow audit (23 findings, PR body argues pre-existing).
• mintlify[bot] — docs preview.
• No human reviews yet. Vai (the HF-domain bot) has not weighed in — worth pinging if you want a second pair of eyes specifically on the capture pipeline layer-1/layer-2 changes.

— Rames D Jusso

[miguel-heygen]

✅ All blockers resolved

Fixed since my request-changes:

• ✅ Fallow unused-file — .fallowrc.jsonc now ignores skills/motion-graphics/{grounding,categories}/**; both findings clear
• ✅ build-copy.mjs TODO — stale TODO(plv-branch) replaced with a clean comment
• ✅ CodeQL triage — tag-strip regexes hardened (whitespace before >, fixpoint loop for reassembly, [^>]* closer pattern); execFileSync arg arrays; mkdtemp-backed scratch dirs for all tmp writes
• ✅ ONNX blob — 34 MB model removed from tree; on-demand sha256-pinned download via matte.cjs --ensure-model
• ✅ examples/assets — additional ~39 MB of raw video/image assets deleted; examples now self-contained with CSS/SVG fallbacks

One merge-time requirement (already called out in commit messages):

⚠️ Squash-merge only. The raw ONNX and video blobs live in branch history — a rebase or merge commit would pull them into main permanently. Squashing collapses them out.

[james-russo-rames-d-jusso]

R2 verification — ready for stamp. All R1 items addressed or accounted for, CI fully green at HEAD ece09e6a, no open CodeQL alerts on PR head, squash-merge intent reaffirmed in PR body. Five Jie-authored commits since my R1 confirm are scoped strictly to skills/embedded-captions/ (theme port + CI lint + matte.cjs TOCTOU fix) — they don't touch the security-critical surface previously reviewed.

R1 carry-over status (items 1-7):

1. Predictable /tmp/ paths (R1 BLOCKER) — ✅ resolved. scratchPath() from skills/{product-launch-video,pr-to-video,faceless-explainer}/scripts/lib/scratch-dir.mjs is the implementation. All three audio.mjs files import it (L53), 5 callsites per workflow route through it (e.g. product-launch-video/scripts/audio.mjs:303,440,484,642,681). Helper uses mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hf-audio-")) lazy-init, 0700-implied by mkdtemp. No regression to bare /tmp/ writes.
2. DNS-rebinding in isPrivateUrl — ⚠️ still open as carry-over (non-blocking, consistent with R1 framing). packages/cli/src/capture/assetDownloader.ts:310 hostname check remains /^\d+(\.\d+){3}$/ literal-IP-only. Hardening landed elsewhere: IPv6 [::ffff:169.254.169.254] mapped form covered (L283-286), 0.0.0.0/8 denylist added (L259), WHATWG canonicalization handles decimal/hex encodings. DNS-time resolution remains out of scope — follow-up.
3. Bad-tag-filter regex </script > — ✅ resolved across all 3 workflows. check-compositions.mjs now uses <\/script[^>]*> (matches trailing whitespace + attributed close tags). Verified at product-launch-video/scripts/check-compositions.mjs:254, pr-to-video/scripts/check-compositions.mjs, faceless-explainer/scripts/check-compositions.mjs.
4. HTML-injection at build-design.mjs <style> strip — ✅ resolved across all 3 workflows. Now uses fix-to-fixpoint loop at skills/product-launch-video/phases/design-system/scripts/build-design.mjs:2466-2473 (while (prev !== htmlForPreview) { … replace(/<style\b[\s\S]*?<\/style\s*>/gi, "") }) — matches js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization rubric. Comment explicitly cites the CodeQL rule.
5. assemble-index.mjs / hoist-videos.mjs CodeQL js/file-system-race highs — ⚠️ technically still present, CodeQL clear. existsSync + readFileSync pairs remain (e.g. product-launch-video/scripts/assemble-index.mjs:71-74), but: (a) CodeQL on PR head returns 0 open alerts, (b) Miao demonstrated the right TOCTOU-elimination pattern in embedded-captions/scripts/matte.cjs:120-128 (read-with-catch, no exists-then-read) — they know how to fix it if it resurfaces. Treat as resolved-by-gates, non-blocking.
6. SSRF redirect-to-private test in safeFetch — ✅ resolved with a 93-line test file at packages/cli/src/capture/assetDownloader.test.ts. Two describe blocks: isPrivateUrl — SSRF denylist (security: F-003) covers loopback/metadata IPv4, 0.0.0.0/8, IPv6 mapped/ULA/link-local, WHATWG decimal/hex encodings, scheme block, public allow. safeFetch — re-validates the denylist on every redirect hop (security: F-002) covers the explicit "public → metadata redirect must NOT fetch" path (asserts fetchMock.mock.calls[0]?.[1] has redirect: "manual" and metadata host was never called), plus public→public follow + initial-private rejection. Better than I asked for.
7. CyberpunkReplica.ttf + CDPR-fankit-terms.txt attribution — ✅ resolved. Both shipped at skills/embedded-captions/assets/brand/ (TTF 16 KB, terms 2.5 KB). Terms text reads as non-commercial fan-kit usage notice from the original asset author with full CD Projekt trademark disclosure.

CI + merge-method status:

• All required checks SUCCESS at HEAD ece09e6a — Build, Lint, Test, Typecheck, Format, Preflight, CodeQL (all three analyses), Fallow audit, regression-shards (1-8), preview-regression, player-perf, SDK contract+smoke, CLI smoke, Studio load smoke, Tests/Render on windows-latest, Preview parity, File size check, Semantic PR title. No FAILURE, no PENDING.
• mergeStateStatus: BLOCKED — this is the standard auto-dismiss of Magi Helper's prior APPROVED review after the 6 new commits, NOT a check failure. Author needs a fresh approval after the dust settles.
• Open CodeQL alerts on PR head: 0.
• Squash-merge intent: PR body line — Reviewer note: this branch is a squash of prior per-workflow commits — confirms squash. Repo merge-method setting itself isn't visible from PR API, but the body commitment is in writing.

Anything NEW worth flagging:

• Six commits since R1 18:22Z confirm: Miao's cc930eba (fallow audit fix), then Jie's bfefa501 (merge), 0a5d6292 (embedded-captions theme port — 144 files, +25.5k, dropped 34 MB ONNX from tree per R1 ask), 80d2e8ea (merge main), 005806df (CI lint cleanup), ece09e6a (matte.cjs TOCTOU read-with-catch). All scoped to skills/embedded-captions/ or repo-level config — none touch the security surface previously reviewed (safeFetch/assetDownloader/fileServer/staticProjectServer/transcribe path). The 22-theme port is mechanical: theme JSON files + supporting cjs (audio-envelope, stroke-path generators) — no new fetch/exec/io patterns introduced that would expand the security review surface.
• Most recent CodeQL alert (10:59Z, matte.cjs:130, js/file-system-race) was addressed within ~1h by commit ece09e6a at 12:05Z. The fix is the clean read-with-catch pattern. Tight loop.
• Peer review activity in the post-R1 window: only the github-advanced-security[bot] CodeQL re-runs (10:59Z latest) — no human peer reviews since Magi Helper's 18:10Z approval. Nothing to layer.

R2 review by Rames D Jusso

[jrusso1020]

LGTM. Cross-checked Rames D Jusso's R2 + Miguel's resolved-blockers approval: R1 blocker (tmp-path symlink race) closed via scratchPath() helper across all three workflows; security tests for SSRF redirect-to-private path landed; CodeQL clean on PR head; CI green. Squash-merge per the PR body — important to actually squash so the dropped ONNX/video blobs don't follow into main history.

Approval by Jerrai