Skip to content
Open
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
56 changes: 56 additions & 0 deletions AUDIT-CICD.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
# CI/CD Pipeline Security Audit

This document outlines the findings of a security audit of the CI/CD pipeline.

## Summary of Findings

| Workflow | Finding | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| `ai-worker.yml` | Secrets Exposure | High |
| `ai-worker.yml` | Command Injection | High |
| `ai-worker.yml` | Third-Party Risk | Medium |
| `auto-label.yml` | Code Injection | High |
| `contributor-ci.yml` | Incomplete Security Scans | Medium |
| `jules-dispatch.yml` | Overly Permissive Scopes | Low |

## Detailed Findings

### 1. ai-worker.yml

**Vulnerability:** Secrets Exposure
- **Description:** The `GEMINI_API_KEY` is exposed in the `env` block, making it accessible to shell commands and increasing the risk of leaks.
- **Severity:** High

**Vulnerability:** Command Injection
- **Description:** The workflow is vulnerable to injection attacks through the `steps.diff.outputs.diff` variable, which can be manipulated by contributors.
- **Severity:** High

**Vulnerability:** Third-Party Risk
- **Description:** The use of `actions/github-script` introduces a third-party dependency that could be compromised.
- **Severity:** Medium

### 2. auto-label.yml

**Vulnerability:** Code Injection
- **Description:** The `github-script` action is susceptible to injection from issue titles and bodies, which can be exploited by malicious actors.
- **Severity:** High

### 3. contributor-ci.yml

**Vulnerability:** Incomplete Security Scans
- **Description:** The workflow includes placeholder steps for linting and security scans but lacks concrete implementations, leaving the pipeline exposed.
- **Severity:** Medium

### 4. jules-dispatch.yml

**Vulnerability:** Overly Permissive Scopes
- **Description:** The workflow grants broad `write` permissions for `contents`, `pull-requests`, and `issues`, violating the principle of least privilege.
- **Severity:** Low

## Mitigation Strategies

- **Secrets Management:** Use encrypted secrets and avoid exposing them in the `env` block.
- **Input Sanitization:** Sanitize all inputs from contributors to prevent injection attacks.
- **Third-Party Dependencies:** Pin third-party actions to a specific commit hash to prevent supply chain attacks.
- **Security Scans:** Implement static and dynamic security scanning tools in the CI/CD pipeline.
- **Least Privilege:** Grant the minimum required permissions to each workflow.
Loading