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Security: hyperpolymath/julia-the-viper

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

We release security updates for the following versions:

Version Supported
0.1.x

Reporting a Vulnerability

DO NOT report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

Reporting Process

  1. Email: Send details to security@julia-viper.dev (or open a private security advisory on GitHub)
  2. Include:
    • Description of the vulnerability
    • Steps to reproduce
    • Potential impact
    • Suggested fix (if any)
  3. Response Time: We aim to respond within 48 hours
  4. Fix Timeline: Critical issues will be patched within 7 days

Security Guarantees

Julia the Viper provides the following architectural security guarantees:

1. Code Injection is Grammatically Impossible

The parser enforces Harvard Architecture separation:

  • Data Language: Only addition allowed, no control flow
  • Control Language: Can use Data results, but Data cannot call Control

Example Attack Prevention:

# In other languages, this could execute:
user_input = "5; import os; os.system('rm -rf /')"
eval(user_input)  # DISASTER!

# In JtV, this is a parse error:
user_value = malicious_input
result = user_value + 10  # Parser rejects non-numeric input

The grammar makes injection impossible to express, not just "hard to do".

2. No Integer Overflow in Data Language

All arithmetic in Data expressions uses checked operations:

  • Addition with overflow detection
  • Bounded iteration counts
  • Type-safe number system conversions

3. No Reentrancy Attacks

Smart contract operations are atomic:

  • State updates happen in single transaction
  • No external calls during state modification
  • Balance checks grammatically enforced

4. Guaranteed Termination for Pure Functions

Functions marked @pure or @total are proven to halt:

  • No unbounded loops allowed in pure context
  • No recursion in Data Language
  • Static analysis verifies termination

Vulnerability Classes

Critical (Immediate Patch)

  • Parser bypass allowing control flow in Data context
  • Memory safety violation in Rust code
  • Type confusion leading to arbitrary code execution

High (7-day Patch)

  • Integer overflow in interpreter
  • Incorrect totality analysis
  • Smart contract state corruption

Medium (30-day Patch)

  • Performance degradation attack (DoS)
  • Error message information disclosure
  • Incorrect optimization

Low (Next Release)

  • Documentation inaccuracies
  • Build system issues
  • Non-critical deprecations

Security Testing

We maintain:

  • Fuzzing: Grammar fuzzing with AFL++
  • Property Testing: QuickCheck-style tests for interpreter
  • Static Analysis: Clippy with security lints
  • Formal Verification: Lean 4 proofs for core properties (planned v2)

Responsible Disclosure

We follow coordinated disclosure:

  1. Day 0: Receive report
  2. Day 1-2: Acknowledge and triage
  3. Day 3-7: Develop fix
  4. Day 8: Private disclosure to affected users
  5. Day 15: Public disclosure with patch

Security Hall of Fame

We recognize security researchers who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities:

  • (No reports yet - be the first!)

Security Contacts

Security-Related Configuration

Recommended Deployment

For smart contracts:

[security]
max_iterations = 1_000_000  # Prevent DoS
enable_trace = false        # Don't leak execution info in production
pure_function_enforcement = true  # Strict purity checking

For development:

[security]
max_iterations = 10_000_000
enable_trace = true
pure_function_enforcement = true

Known Security Considerations

Type System (v1)

  • Currently no type checking - planned for v1.1
  • Runtime type errors possible
  • Mitigation: Explicit type annotations

Module System (v1)

  • Import resolution not fully implemented
  • No namespace isolation yet
  • Mitigation: Use single-file programs for now

WASM Backend (v1)

  • Code generation incomplete
  • No sandboxing yet
  • Mitigation: Use interpreter for security-critical code

Cryptographic Usage

JtV itself does not implement cryptography, but smart contracts may:

DO:

  • Use established cryptographic libraries (libsodium, ring)
  • Verify signatures before state changes
  • Use constant-time operations

DON'T:

  • Implement crypto in JtV itself (use FFI)
  • Roll your own crypto
  • Use weak algorithms (MD5, SHA1)

Security Roadmap

  • v1.1: Type checking to prevent type confusion
  • v1.2: Module isolation for security boundaries
  • v2.0: Formal verification with Lean 4
  • v2.1: Certified compilation (CompCert-style)

Last updated: 2025-01-22

There aren’t any published security advisories