release: v1.1.6 — sc_flowise_js_rce (Flowise CVE-2025-59528, CVSS 10.0)#63
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Adds `sc_flowise_js_rce` (Flowise CVE-2025-59528, CVSS 10.0): JavaScript `Function()` constructor / `eval()` patterns combined with dangerous Node.js system module references (`child_process`, `fs`, `os`, `net`, `process.env`, `execSync`, `spawnSync`), or the same patterns appearing inside MCP server configuration fields (`mcpServerConfig`, `"command":`, `"args":`). Also covers the `Function.prototype.constructor` prototype-chain bypass. CVE-2025-59528 (CVSS 10.0): the Flowise CustomMCP node parsed `mcpServerConfig` and executed it via JavaScript's `Function()` constructor — functionally identical to `eval()` — without any validation. A single `new Function('return require("child_process").execSync("id")')()` payload achieves host-level RCE on the Flowise server, exposing every LLM API key, database credential, and OS resource stored or reachable by the application. 12,000-15,000 Flowise instances remained unpatched when exploitation began in April 2026, more than six months after the patch (Flowise 3.1.1) was released. An AI agent receiving indirect prompt injection through a poisoned tool response or retrieved document could be directed to inject this payload into a Flowise workflow configuration. This release is a manual follow-up that salvages the detector from closed PR #62. PR #62 was closed because it raced PR #61 for the v1.1.5 slot and lost on the merge order; the underlying detector is unrelated to that race and is shipped here on its own. Sourced from `origin/claude/eloquent-davinci-sBngG` (the PR #62 branch) verbatim, with only release-metadata changes (version 1.1.5 -> 1.1.6, CHANGELOG section moved out of v1.1.5 into v1.1.6, INDEX/ROTATION untouched since this is not a new auto-improvement rotation cycle). Tests: 1582 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (measured 2026-05-18 via `uv run --no-sync pytest --tb=no -q` on this branch). 14 new tests added for `sc_flowise_js_rce` (10 true positives covering Function() + dangerous modules, MCP config field injection, and prototype-chain bypass; 4 true negatives covering legitimate Function() use, JSON5.parse() prose, safe inline arithmetic Function() calls, and educational mentions of `require`). Signed-off-by: killertcell428 <killertcell428@gmail.com>
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Summary
sc_flowise_js_rcefrom closed PR #62 and ships it as v1.1.6.What changed
1 new supply-chain detector (
aigis/filters/patterns.py)sc_flowise_js_rce— JavaScript Function() Constructor / eval() in MCP Configuration (score 85)Flowise CVE-2025-59528 (CVSS 10.0, exploited April 2026). The Flowise CustomMCP node parsed user-supplied
mcpServerConfigJSON and executed it via JavaScript'sFunction()constructor — functionally identical toeval()— with no validation. A single payload achieves host-level RCE on the Flowise server, exposing every LLM API key, database credential, and OS resource reachable by the application. 12,000–15,000 instances remained unpatched when exploitation began, more than six months after Flowise 3.1.1 shipped the fix.The pattern catches:
new Function(...)withchild_process/fs/os/net/http/https/process.env/execSync/spawnSync/.exec(referencesFunction.prototype.constructor(...)— prototype-chain bypass for naiveeval-string blocklistseval(...)/new Function(...)/require('child_process'...)appearing inside MCPmcpServerConfig/"command":/"args":fieldsExample blocked input:
Example benign (not blocked):
Provenance
Detector source:
origin/claude/eloquent-davinci-sBngG(the PR #62 branch) verbatim. Only release-metadata changed: version bumped 1.1.5 → 1.1.6, CHANGELOG section moved out of v1.1.5 and into v1.1.6.auto-improvement/INDEX.mdandROTATION.mdare intentionally not touched — this is not a new rotation cycle, it is a follow-up to cycle 9.Test plan
uv run --no-sync pytest --tb=no -q→ 1582 passed · 0 failed · 0 skipped (measured 2026-05-18 on this branch)uv run --no-sync ruff check aigis/filters/patterns.py tests/test_incident_postmortems3.py→ All checks passedFunction()+ each ofchild_process/execSync/spawnSync/fs/process.env/net;Function.prototype.constructorprototype-chain bypass;mcpServerConfigwitheval()andnew Function();"command":withchild_processFunction(); mention ofJSON5.parse()fix; safenew Function('x', 'return x + 1')(5)arithmetic use; prose mention ofrequire('child_process')🤖 Generated with Claude Code