feat(rules): core threat detection rules for coding agents#7
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MiguelHzBz wants to merge 2 commits intoleogr:mainfrom
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feat(rules): core threat detection rules for coding agents#7MiguelHzBz wants to merge 2 commits intoleogr:mainfrom
MiguelHzBz wants to merge 2 commits intoleogr:mainfrom
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Adds rules/default/threat_rules.yaml covering the primary threat categories for AI coding agent abuse: Credential access, dangerous commands (rm -rf, chmod 777, etc.), pipe-to-shell execution, encoded payload execution, data exfiltration via curl/wget, MCP tool call confirmation, writes to temp/staging paths, reverse shell patterns, and supply chain attack indicators. Includes test_threat_rules.sh with comprehensive test coverage (R1-R16).
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- Add 'rm --recursive' to is_dangerous_command (T1: long-form flags bypass rm -rf/-fr string match) - Add absolute shell paths | /bin/bash, | /bin/sh, | /usr/bin/bash, | /usr/bin/sh to is_pipe_to_shell (T2: absolute path bypass) - Add node -e, node --eval, php -r to is_encoded_exec (T3: Node.js/PHP one-liners not covered) - Add IMDS numeric IP variants (2852039166, 0xa9fea9fe, 0251.0376.0251.0376) to is_imds_access (T4: encoded IP forms bypass literal 169.254.169.254) - Add is_read_credential_path macro and Deny credential file access via Read tool rule covering ~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.gnupg, ~/.netrc, ~/.docker/config.json (T5: Bash-only credential rule misses direct Read tool calls) - Add test_threat_bypass.sh covering all 5 bypass sections (~20 test cases)
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Summary
Adds
rules/user/threat_rules.yamlcovering the primary threat categories for AI coding agent abuse:/etc/passwd,~/.ssh/, AWS credentials, etc.)rm -rf,chmod 777,dd if=/dev/, etc.)curl | bash,wget | sh, etc.)base64 -d | bash,echo ... | python, etc.)/tmp/,/dev/shm/)Test plan
bash tests/test_threat_rules.sh— comprehensive test suite covering R1–R16