fix(windows): carry async ACL harden onto dig2-go (#645)

src/config.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import {
   MAIN_CODEX_ACCOUNT_NAMESPACE_TARGET,
 } from "./codex/account-namespace-match";
 import { COMBO_NAMESPACE, comboConfigIssues } from "./combos/types";
-import { hardenSecretDir, hardenSecretPath } from "./lib/windows-secret-acl";
+import { hardenSecretDir, hardenSecretPath, hardenSecretPathAsync } from "./lib/windows-secret-acl";
 import { providerDestinationConfigError } from "./lib/destination-policy";
 import { openRouterRoutingConfigError } from "./providers/openrouter-routing";
 import {
@@ -135,6 +135,90 @@ export function atomicWriteFile(path: string, content: string, io: AtomicWriteIO
   }
 }
 
+/** Async atomic-write I/O: harden may await icacls without blocking the event loop (#612). */
+export interface AtomicWriteAsyncIO {
+  write: (path: string, content: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+  harden: (path: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+  rename: (source: string, destination: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+  truncate: (path: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+  unlink: (path: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+}
+
+async function renameAtomicFileAsync(source: string, destination: string): Promise<void> {
+  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt += 1) {
+    try {
+      renameSync(source, destination);
+      return;
+    } catch (error) {
+      const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
+      const transientWindowsError = process.platform === "win32"
+        && (code === "EBUSY" || code === "EPERM" || code === "EACCES");
+      if (!transientWindowsError || attempt >= 2) throw error;
+      await Bun.sleep(25 * (attempt + 1));
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Async atomic write (#612): same temp+harden+rename and residual-temp policy as
+ * atomicWriteFile, but Windows ACL harden yields the event loop. Timeout memo is keyed
+ * by the final destination path (not the unique temp, not the parent directory).
+ */
+export async function atomicWriteFileAsync(
+  path: string,
+  content: string,
+  io?: AtomicWriteAsyncIO,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const effective: AtomicWriteAsyncIO = io ?? {
+    write: (target, value) => writeFileSync(target, value, { encoding: "utf-8", mode: 0o600 }),
+    harden: async target => {
+      try { chmodSync(target, 0o600); } catch { /* platform may ignore chmod */ }
+      if (process.platform === "win32") {
+        await hardenSecretPathAsync(target, { required: true, timeoutMemoKey: path });
+      }
+    },
+    rename: renameAtomicFileAsync,
+    truncate: target => truncateSync(target, 0),
+    unlink: unlinkSync,
+  };
+  const tmp = `${path}.ocx.${process.pid}.${++_atomicSeq}.tmp`;
+  let hardened = false;
+  try {
+    await effective.write(tmp, content);
+    await effective.harden(tmp);
+    hardened = true;
+    await effective.rename(tmp, path);
+  } catch (cause) {
+    let scrubbed = false;
+    try {
+      await effective.truncate(tmp);
+      scrubbed = true;
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (isMissingPathError(error)) scrubbed = true;
+      else {
+        try { await effective.write(tmp, ""); scrubbed = true; } catch { /* removal may still succeed */ }
+      }
+    }
+    let removed = false;
+    try {
+      await effective.unlink(tmp);
+      removed = true;
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (isMissingPathError(error)) removed = true;
+      else {
+        try { await effective.unlink(tmp); removed = true; }
+        catch (retryError) { if (isMissingPathError(retryError)) removed = true; }
+      }
+    }
+    if (!removed && !scrubbed) throw new AtomicWriteSecretResidualError(tmp, { cause });
+    if (!removed && !hardened) {
+      try { await effective.harden(tmp); hardened = true; } catch { /* zero-byte residual is reported honestly */ }
+    }
+    if (!removed) throw new AtomicWriteResidualTempError(tmp, hardened, { cause });
+    throw cause;
+  }
+}
+
 export class OpenAiTierBackupCleanupError extends Error {
   constructor() { super("OpenAI tier backup temporary cleanup failed"); this.name = "OpenAiTierBackupCleanupError"; }
 }

src/lib/windows-secret-acl.ts

@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
  *     icacls cannot block OAuth logins or token refresh (field report: Kimi auth
  *     stuck behind ETIMEDOUT). Real EPERM/EACCES/exit-code failures still throw:
  *     availability never silently overrides confidentiality for those.
+ *   hardenSecretPathAsync / hardenSecretDirAsync — same policy, async icacls
+ *     runner so the event loop is not held for the child lifetime (#612).
+ *   HardenOptions.timeoutMemoKey — optional destination-path key for the
+ *     timeout memo (atomic writers mint unique temps; never a parent directory).
  *   hardenSecretDir  — same contract for directories.
  */
 
@@ -42,6 +46,13 @@ export interface HardenResult {
 
 export interface HardenOptions {
   required: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Optional timeout-memo key distinct from `targetPath` (issue #612).
+   * Atomic writers mint a fresh `.tmp` path per write; keying the timeout cache by the
+   * final destination path prevents re-stalling the event loop on every subsequent temp.
+   * Must NOT be a parent directory — directory ACLs are not authoritative for new files.
+   */
+  timeoutMemoKey?: string;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -72,6 +83,7 @@ export interface IcaclsResult {
 }
 
 type IcaclsRunner = (args: string[], timeoutMs: number) => IcaclsResult;
+type AsyncIcaclsRunner = (args: string[], timeoutMs: number) => Promise<IcaclsResult>;
 
 function defaultIcaclsRunner(args: string[], timeoutMs: number): IcaclsResult {
   // Bun.spawnSync with windowsHide: Node execFileSync has hung under the GUI/proxy even
@@ -91,7 +103,43 @@ function defaultIcaclsRunner(args: string[], timeoutMs: number): IcaclsResult {
   };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Async icacls runner (#612): yields the event loop while waiting for the child.
+ * Timeout provenance is recorded by our timer (async Subprocess has no exitedDueToTimeout);
+ * we still await process exit before classifying so settlement is confirmed.
+ */
+async function defaultAsyncIcaclsRunner(args: string[], timeoutMs: number): Promise<IcaclsResult> {
+  const proc = Bun.spawn(["icacls.exe", ...args], {
+    stdin: "ignore",
+    stdout: "pipe",
+    stderr: "ignore",
+    windowsHide: true,
+  });
+  let timedOutByUs = false;
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+    timedOutByUs = true;
+    try { proc.kill(); } catch { /* already exited */ }
+  }, Math.max(1, timeoutMs));
+  let exitCode: number | null = null;
+  try {
+    exitCode = await proc.exited;
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+  const stdout = proc.stdout
+    ? await new Response(proc.stdout).text().catch(() => "")
+    : "";
+  const timedOut = timedOutByUs;
+  return {
+    success: !timedOut && exitCode === 0,
+    exitCode: timedOut ? null : exitCode,
+    timedOut,
+    stdout,
+  };
+}
+
 let icaclsRunner: IcaclsRunner = defaultIcaclsRunner;
+let asyncIcaclsRunner: AsyncIcaclsRunner = defaultAsyncIcaclsRunner;
 let platformOverride: string | null = null;
 let nowFn: () => number = Date.now;
 
@@ -100,6 +148,11 @@ export function setIcaclsRunnerForTests(runner: IcaclsRunner | null): void {
   icaclsRunner = runner ?? defaultIcaclsRunner;
 }
 
+/** Test seam: replace the async icacls runner. Pass null to restore the default. */
+export function setAsyncIcaclsRunnerForTests(runner: AsyncIcaclsRunner | null): void {
+  asyncIcaclsRunner = runner ?? defaultAsyncIcaclsRunner;
+}
+
 /** Test seam: force the platform gate (e.g. "win32") so CI on POSIX reaches the runner. */
 export function setPlatformForTests(value: string | null): void {
   platformOverride = value;
@@ -156,6 +209,10 @@ function currentWindowsUser(): string | undefined {
  */
 const BROAD_SIDS = ["*S-1-1-0", "*S-1-5-11", "*S-1-5-32-545"] as const;
 
+function grantAce(user: string, directory: boolean): string {
+  return directory ? `${user}:(OI)(CI)(F)` : `${user}:(F)`;
+}
+
 function runIcacls(targetPath: string, directory: boolean, deadline: number): void {
   const user = currentWindowsUser();
   if (!user) {
@@ -177,8 +234,7 @@ function runIcacls(targetPath: string, directory: boolean, deadline: number): vo
 
   // Step 1: grant current user full control BEFORE any destructive ACL change.
   // If this fails, inheritance is untouched and the writer keeps inherited access.
-  const grant = directory ? `${user}:(OI)(CI)(F)` : `${user}:(F)`;
-  runOrThrow("/grant:r", [targetPath, "/grant:r", grant]);
+  runOrThrow("/grant:r", [targetPath, "/grant:r", grantAce(user, directory)]);
 
   // Step 2: disable inheritance and remove inherited ACEs. The explicit owner ACE
   // from step 1 survives this transition, so a later failure still leaves cleanup access.
@@ -205,6 +261,41 @@ function runIcacls(targetPath: string, directory: boolean, deadline: number): vo
   }
 }
 
+/** Async counterpart of runIcacls — same step order and timeout/error classification (#612). */
+async function runIcaclsAsync(targetPath: string, directory: boolean, deadline: number): Promise<void> {
+  const user = currentWindowsUser();
+  if (!user) {
+    throw new Error("Cannot determine current Windows user for ACL hardening");
+  }
+
+  const run = async (step: string, args: string[]): Promise<IcaclsResult> => {
+    const remaining = deadline - nowFn();
+    if (remaining <= 0) {
+      throw icaclsError(step, { success: false, exitCode: null, timedOut: true, stdout: "" });
+    }
+    return asyncIcaclsRunner(args, remaining);
+  };
+  const runOrThrow = async (step: string, args: string[]): Promise<void> => {
+    const result = await run(step, args);
+    if (!result.success) throw icaclsError(step, result);
+  };
+
+  await runOrThrow("/grant:r", [targetPath, "/grant:r", grantAce(user, directory)]);
+  await runOrThrow("/inheritance:r", [targetPath, "/inheritance:r"]);
+
+  const removal = await run("/remove:g", [targetPath, "/remove:g", ...BROAD_SIDS]);
+  if (!removal.success) {
+    if (removal.timedOut) throw icaclsError("/remove:g", removal);
+    for (const sid of BROAD_SIDS) {
+      const found = await run("/findsid", [targetPath, "/findsid", sid]);
+      if (!found.success) throw icaclsError("/findsid", found);
+      if (found.stdout.includes(targetPath)) {
+        throw icaclsError("/remove:g", removal);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Sanitize an error from a failed ACL operation into a safe diagnostic string.
  * The raw path must not appear in the returned string (it may contain
@@ -254,6 +345,27 @@ function describeAclStateAfterTimeout(targetPath: string, deadline: number): str
   }
 }
 
+async function describeAclStateAfterTimeoutAsync(targetPath: string, deadline: number): Promise<string> {
+  try {
+    for (const sid of BROAD_SIDS) {
+      const remaining = deadline - nowFn();
+      if (remaining <= 0) return "ACL state unverified (budget exhausted)";
+      const found = await asyncIcaclsRunner([targetPath, "/findsid", sid], remaining);
+      if (!found.success) return "ACL state unverified (probe failed)";
+      if (found.stdout.includes(targetPath)) return "broad ACL grants still present";
+    }
+    return "no broad ACL grants detected (hardening still incomplete)";
+  } catch {
+    return "ACL state unverified (probe failed)";
+  }
+}
+
+function timeoutMemoKey(targetPath: string, opts: HardenOptions): string {
+  // Destination-path memo only (issue #612). Never a parent directory — directory ACLs
+  // are not authoritative for newly created temps.
+  return opts.timeoutMemoKey ?? targetPath;
+}
+
 /**
  * Shared harden flow for files and directories: one total budget (env-configurable)
  * covering the initial attempt, ONE timeout retry, and the diagnostic verification.
@@ -269,7 +381,8 @@ function hardenEntry(
   if (!existsSync(targetPath)) return { ok: true };
   if (effectivePlatform() !== "win32") return { ok: true };
   if (cache.has(targetPath)) return { ok: true };
-  if (timedOutPaths.has(targetPath)) {
+  const memoKey = timeoutMemoKey(targetPath, opts);
+  if (timedOutPaths.has(memoKey)) {
     return { ok: false, diagnostics: "ACL hardening skipped — previous attempt timed out" };
   }
 
@@ -289,7 +402,7 @@ function hardenEntry(
 
   const diagnostics = sanitizeDiagnostics(lastErr);
   if (isTimeoutError(lastErr)) {
-    timedOutPaths.add(targetPath);
+    timedOutPaths.add(memoKey);
     const state = describeAclStateAfterTimeout(targetPath, deadline);
     const annotated = `${diagnostics}; ${state}`;
     // Timeout-only soft-fail: a hung icacls must not block OAuth/token writes.
@@ -301,6 +414,47 @@ function hardenEntry(
   return { ok: false, diagnostics };
 }
 
+/** Async counterpart of hardenEntry — yields while waiting on icacls (#612). */
+async function hardenEntryAsync(
+  targetPath: string,
+  directory: boolean,
+  opts: HardenOptions,
+  cache: Set<string>,
+): Promise<HardenResult> {
+  if (!existsSync(targetPath)) return { ok: true };
+  if (effectivePlatform() !== "win32") return { ok: true };
+  if (cache.has(targetPath)) return { ok: true };
+  const memoKey = timeoutMemoKey(targetPath, opts);
+  if (timedOutPaths.has(memoKey)) {
+    return { ok: false, diagnostics: "ACL hardening skipped — previous attempt timed out" };
+  }
+
+  const deadline = nowFn() + resolveHardenDeadlineMs();
+  let lastErr: unknown;
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
+    if (attempt > 0 && deadline - nowFn() <= 0) break;
+    try {
+      await runIcaclsAsync(targetPath, directory, deadline);
+      cache.add(targetPath);
+      return { ok: true };
+    } catch (err) {
+      lastErr = err;
+      if (!isTimeoutError(err)) break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  const diagnostics = sanitizeDiagnostics(lastErr);
+  if (isTimeoutError(lastErr)) {
+    timedOutPaths.add(memoKey);
+    const state = await describeAclStateAfterTimeoutAsync(targetPath, deadline);
+    const annotated = `${diagnostics}; ${state}`;
+    console.warn(`[opencodex] ${annotated} — continuing without NTFS ACL harden`);
+    return { ok: false, diagnostics: annotated };
+  }
+  if (opts.required) throw new Error(diagnostics);
+  return { ok: false, diagnostics };
+}
+
 /**
  * Harden a single file path with per-user NTFS ACLs on Windows.
  * On non-Windows platforms, returns ok:true immediately (caller owns chmod).
@@ -312,6 +466,14 @@ export function hardenSecretPath(targetPath: string, opts: HardenOptions): Harde
   return hardenEntry(targetPath, false, opts, hardenedPaths);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Async harden for write paths that must not block the event loop (#612).
+ * Same success/timeout/error policy as hardenSecretPath.
+ */
+export function hardenSecretPathAsync(targetPath: string, opts: HardenOptions): Promise<HardenResult> {
+  return hardenEntryAsync(targetPath, false, opts, hardenedPaths);
+}
+
 /**
  * Harden a directory path with per-user NTFS ACLs on Windows.
  * On non-Windows platforms, returns ok:true immediately (caller owns chmod).
@@ -322,3 +484,10 @@ export function hardenSecretPath(targetPath: string, opts: HardenOptions): Harde
 export function hardenSecretDir(targetPath: string, opts: HardenOptions): HardenResult {
   return hardenEntry(targetPath, true, opts, hardenedDirectories);
 }
+
+/**
+ * Async directory harden (#612). Same policy as hardenSecretDir.
+ */
+export function hardenSecretDirAsync(targetPath: string, opts: HardenOptions): Promise<HardenResult> {
+  return hardenEntryAsync(targetPath, true, opts, hardenedDirectories);
+}