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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions Cargo.toml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ members = [
]
exclude = [
"examples/wasmtime-loader",
"verification/torture-runner",
"verification/witness-harness",
]

Expand Down
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions verification/torture-runner/.gitignore
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/target/
/Cargo.lock
17 changes: 17 additions & 0 deletions verification/torture-runner/Cargo.toml
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[package]
name = "wsc-torture-runner"
version = "0.0.0"
edition = "2024"
publish = false
description = "I/O fault-injection torture runner for wsc-verify-core — curl-style torture testing adapted for Rust's error model. Excluded from the main workspace; run with `cargo run --manifest-path verification/torture-runner/Cargo.toml --bin <target>`."

[[bin]]
name = "torture_module_parser"
path = "src/torture_module_parser.rs"

[[bin]]
name = "torture_sig_parser"
path = "src/torture_sig_parser.rs"

[dependencies]
wsc-verify-core = { path = "../../src/verify-core" }
88 changes: 88 additions & 0 deletions verification/torture-runner/README.md
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# torture-runner — I/O fault-injection for `wsc-verify-core`

Curl-style torture testing adapted for Rust's error model. Runs each
target parser/verifier against every byte-offset fault point and asserts
no panic.

This crate is **excluded from the main workspace** (run via
`cargo run --manifest-path verification/torture-runner/Cargo.toml --bin <name>`).

## Why I/O fault injection, not allocation fault injection

The classic curl torture model overrides `malloc` to fail on the Nth
call, exercising every out-of-memory path in C code. **That model does
not transfer cleanly to Rust.** Safe-Rust collection APIs
(`Vec::with_capacity`, `Box::new`, `String::from`, …) abort the process
via `handle_alloc_error` on null-return from `GlobalAlloc` — they do
not return `Result<_, AllocError>`. There is no stable pathway from
"alloc returned null" to a clean `Err` propagation in safe Rust, so
"fail Nth alloc" in Rust produces aborts, not the `Result` error-path
exercise curl actually got out of malloc-failure injection.

The Rust analog is **I/O fault injection**. Every `?` on `std::io::Read`
and every error variant in `WSError`/`CoreError` is a reachable error
path *by design*. A `Read` impl that returns `Err` at a chosen byte
offset exercises the same kind of "every error branch reached" curl's
torture model produces — on the surface where Rust actually surfaces
errors.

## How the runner works

For target `f(reader) -> Result<_, _>` and a valid byte input of
length `N`:

1. The runner runs `f` once per fault point `0..=N`.
2. Each run feeds `f` a `FaultyReader` that returns the first `k`
bytes cleanly, then `Err(ErrorKind::Other)` on every subsequent
call.
3. The runner asserts that **every** run returns cleanly — `Ok(_)` if
`f` consumed less than `k` bytes, `Err(_)` otherwise. A panic from
any run is a torture failure.

`ErrorKind::Other` (not `Interrupted`) is deliberate: `std::io`
auto-retries `Interrupted` in several stdlib wrappers (`BufReader`,
`read_to_end`, etc.), which would silently swallow the injected fault
into an infinite loop. `Other` is terminal — the target's error path
actually fires.

## Running

```sh
cd verification/torture-runner

cargo run --bin torture_module_parser
# [Module::init_from_reader + iterate] input 15 bytes
# — 16 fault points exercised: ok=1 err=15 panic=0
# ✔ Module::init_from_reader survived I/O torture at every byte offset.

cargo run --bin torture_sig_parser
# [SignatureForHashes::deserialize] input 7 bytes
# — 8 fault points exercised: ok=1 err=7 panic=0
# ✔ SignatureForHashes::deserialize survived I/O torture at every byte offset.
```

`ok=1` is the no-fault sanity-check run (`fail_at >= input.len()`);
`err=N` is each fault offset returning cleanly through the target's
error path; `panic=N` would be the torture failure condition — zero is
the gate.

## Phase 1 scope and follow-ups

This PoC demonstrates the harness works end-to-end on two real
verification-core entry points. Natural extensions:

- **More targets.** `PublicKey::verify_multi` (needs a real signed-module
fixture), `Module::init_from_reader` with larger / multi-section
inputs, every public `*_from_reader` entry in the verify-core surface.
- **Filesystem / syscall torture.** A `FaultyOpenOptions` for
`secure_file::read_secure`, so the "file permissions check fails
partway through key load" path is exercised.
- **Network torture for `wsc`.** A fault-injecting `ureq::Transport`
for the keyless Fulcio/Rekor calls in `wsc` (outside this crate
since `wsc-verify-core` deliberately has no network layer).
- **CI gate.** Wire `torture_*` binaries into a workflow that runs them
on each PR — surviving torture becomes a non-negotiable acceptance
criterion, the same way the existing mutation-test gate is.

The runner deliberately stays small (~110 lines of `lib.rs`) so the
fault-injection mechanism itself is auditable.
154 changes: 154 additions & 0 deletions verification/torture-runner/src/lib.rs
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//! I/O fault-injection harness — the Rust-faithful analog of curl's
//! allocation-failure torture testing.
//!
//! # Why I/O, not allocation
//!
//! curl's `torture` model overrides `malloc` to fail on the Nth call,
//! exercising every out-of-memory path in C code. That model does **not**
//! transfer cleanly to Rust: safe-Rust collection APIs (`Vec::with_capacity`,
//! `Box::new`, `String::from`, etc.) abort the process via
//! `handle_alloc_error` on null-return from `GlobalAlloc` — they do not
//! return `Result<_, AllocError>`. There is no stable Rust pathway from
//! "alloc returns null" to a clean `Err` propagation, so "fail Nth alloc"
//! in Rust produces aborts, not the `Result` error-path exercise we want.
//!
//! The Rust analog is **I/O fault injection**. Every `?` operator on an
//! `std::io::Read` (and every error variant in `WSError`/`CoreError`) is a
//! reachable error path *by design*. If we can drive a `Read` impl that
//! returns an `Err` at a chosen byte offset, we exercise the same kind of
//! "every error branch reached" coverage curl's torture model achieves —
//! but on the surface Rust actually surfaces errors on.
//!
//! # Workflow
//!
//! For a target function `f(reader) -> Result<_, _>` and a valid byte input
//! of length `N`, the torture runner:
//!
//! 1. Calls `f` once on the full input (no fault) — sanity-check it
//! returns `Ok` and the function actually consumes input.
//! 2. Re-runs `f` `N + 1` times, each with a `FaultyReader` that returns
//! `Err(ErrorKind::Interrupted)` after byte `k` (for `k = 0..=N`).
//! 3. Asserts that **every** run returns cleanly — `Ok(_)` if `f`
//! happened to finish before the fault point, `Err(_)` otherwise. A
//! `panic` from any run is a torture failure.
//!
//! This guarantees the target's error handling reaches every byte offset
//! at which a real I/O error could occur — corrupt files, truncated
//! network reads, short syscall returns.

use std::io::{Read, Result as IoResult};
use std::panic::{AssertUnwindSafe, catch_unwind};

/// A `Read` that returns the first `fail_at` bytes of `data` cleanly, then
/// returns `ErrorKind::Interrupted` on every subsequent call.
pub struct FaultyReader<'a> {
data: &'a [u8],
fail_at: usize,
bytes_read: usize,
}

impl<'a> FaultyReader<'a> {
pub fn new(data: &'a [u8], fail_at: usize) -> Self {
Self {
data,
fail_at,
bytes_read: 0,
}
}
}

impl<'a> Read for FaultyReader<'a> {
fn read(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> IoResult<usize> {
// EOF wins over fault: once the input is exhausted, no more "reads"
// can plausibly happen — surfacing a fault past EOF would test a
// scenario the OS never produces. This also makes the "fail_at >=
// input.len()" run a clean no-fault sanity check.
if self.bytes_read >= self.data.len() {
return Ok(0);
}
if self.bytes_read >= self.fail_at {
// `ErrorKind::Other` (NOT `Interrupted`) — `std::io::Read`
// documents that callers SHOULD retry `Interrupted`, and several
// stdlib wrappers (BufReader, read_to_end, …) silently auto-retry
// it. Using `Other` makes the fault terminal so the target's
// error path actually fires.
return Err(std::io::Error::other(
"torture: injected fault at requested offset",
));
}
let remaining = self.data.len() - self.bytes_read;
let cap_to_fault = self.fail_at - self.bytes_read;
let to_read = remaining.min(buf.len()).min(cap_to_fault);
if to_read == 0 {
return Ok(0);
}
buf[..to_read].copy_from_slice(&self.data[self.bytes_read..self.bytes_read + to_read]);
self.bytes_read += to_read;
Ok(to_read)
}
}

/// Outcome of a single torture iteration.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Outcome {
/// Target returned `Ok` — the fault point was past where the target read.
Ok,
/// Target returned `Err` — the fault was surfaced cleanly through the
/// target's error path.
Err,
/// Target panicked — torture failure.
Panic,
}

/// Drive `target` against every byte offset of `input` as a fault point.
///
/// Returns one `Outcome` per offset `0..=input.len()`. Prints a summary.
/// Panics if any iteration panicked (the torture failure condition).
pub fn torture_io<T, R>(label: &str, input: &[u8], target: T) -> Vec<Outcome>
where
T: Fn(&mut FaultyReader<'_>) -> Result<(), R>,
{
let mut outcomes = Vec::with_capacity(input.len() + 1);
let mut ok = 0usize;
let mut err = 0usize;
let mut panicked = 0usize;
let mut panic_points = Vec::new();

for fail_at in 0..=input.len() {
let result = catch_unwind(AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
let mut reader = FaultyReader::new(input, fail_at);
target(&mut reader)
}));
let outcome = match result {
Ok(Ok(())) => {
ok += 1;
Outcome::Ok
}
Ok(Err(_)) => {
err += 1;
Outcome::Err
}
Err(_) => {
panicked += 1;
panic_points.push(fail_at);
Outcome::Panic
}
};
outcomes.push(outcome);
}

println!(
"[{label}] input {} bytes — {} fault points exercised: ok={ok} err={err} panic={panicked}",
input.len(),
outcomes.len()
);

if panicked > 0 {
panic!(
"[{label}] TORTURE FAILURE — {} panic(s) at fault offsets {:?}",
panicked, panic_points
);
}

outcomes
}
37 changes: 37 additions & 0 deletions verification/torture-runner/src/torture_module_parser.rs
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//! Torture `Module::init_from_reader` + section iteration against I/O
//! fault injection on a valid WASM module.

use wsc_torture_runner::torture_io;
use wsc_verify_core::wasm_module::Module;

fn main() {
// Minimal valid WASM module: magic + version + an empty custom section.
// Layout: 8-byte header, then section ID 0x00 (custom), section size,
// name-length varint, name bytes, payload (empty).
let module_bytes: &[u8] = &[
// magic + version
0x00, 0x61, 0x73, 0x6D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
// section id 0 (custom)
0x00,
// section size: 5 bytes follow (name_len + name + empty payload)
0x05,
// name_len: 4
0x04,
// name: "test"
b't', b'e', b's', b't',
];

// Torture: at every byte offset, force a Read::read() error. Module
// parsing must surface a clean Err without panicking.
torture_io("Module::init_from_reader + iterate", module_bytes, |reader| {
let stream = Module::init_from_reader(reader)?;
for section in Module::iterate(stream)? {
// The `?` here forces every section-parsing error path to be
// exercised when faults land mid-section.
let _section = section?;
}
Ok::<(), wsc_verify_core::CoreError>(())
});

println!("\n✔ Module::init_from_reader survived I/O torture at every byte offset.");
}
49 changes: 49 additions & 0 deletions verification/torture-runner/src/torture_sig_parser.rs
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//! Torture `SignatureForHashes::deserialize` against I/O fault injection.
//!
//! Builds a minimal-but-structurally-valid signature-section payload and
//! drives the parser against every fault offset. Exercises the `?` paths
//! in `varint::get_slice`, `varint::get32`, `read_exact`, and the
//! certificate-chain loop.

use std::io::Read;
use wsc_torture_runner::torture_io;
use wsc_verify_core::signature::SignatureForHashes;

fn main() {
// Build a signature payload: empty key_id + Ed25519 alg id + signature
// varint(3, [0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC]) + cert_count(0).
let payload: Vec<u8> = vec![
0x00, // key_id length = 0 (no key_id)
0x01, // alg_id = ED25519_PK_ID (1)
0x03, // signature length varint = 3
0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, // signature bytes
0x00, // cert_count varint = 0 (no cert chain)
];

// SignatureForHashes::deserialize takes `impl AsRef<[u8]>`, not a Reader,
// so we adapt by draining the FaultyReader into a Vec inside the closure.
// The fault therefore manifests as a short / truncated buffer fed to
// deserialize — exactly the realistic adversarial-input scenario the
// parser must handle without panicking.
torture_io("SignatureForHashes::deserialize", &payload, |reader| {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
// read_to_end ignores Interrupted errors and keeps trying, so use a
// manual loop that stops at the injected error to make the fault
// visible to the parser.
let mut chunk = [0u8; 32];
loop {
match reader.read(&mut chunk) {
Ok(0) => break,
Ok(n) => buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]),
Err(e) => {
// Surface the IO error as a parse error so it lands on
// the same `Result` channel the parser uses.
return Err(wsc_verify_core::CoreError::IOError(e));
}
}
}
SignatureForHashes::deserialize(&buf).map(|_| ())
});

println!("\n✔ SignatureForHashes::deserialize survived I/O torture at every byte offset.");
}
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