Operational hygiene on Windows: orphan node.exe accumulation from Claude Code's MCP, plugin, and LSP children when the parent dies abnormally. The fix is binding the process tree to the parent's lifetime so the kernel reaps it.

• Malware that already has code execution on the host.
• Compromised claude.exe or upstream MCP server packages.
• Side-channel attacks against claude.exe's working memory.
• Privilege escalation.

If your threat model includes any of those, this is not the right layer. AppLocker, WDAC, and EDR sit there.

What the runtime can do:

• Enumerate processes the current user owns (read-only inventory).
• Terminate processes that match user-authored kill criteria in ~/.reap/config.json. Default criteria match nothing.
• Wrap claude.exe in a Win32 Job Object so the kernel terminates the entire child-process tree when the wrapper exits.
• Append decisions to ~/.claude/hooks/reap.log.

What it cannot do:

• Escalate privileges.
• Install services or scheduled tasks.
• Read or write the registry.
• Make network calls of any kind.

Full per-surface scope, with greppable verify commands, lives in the README's Auditable section.

Open a private security advisory at https://github.com/ron2k1/claude-code-structured-concurrency/security/advisories/new, or email ronilbasu@gmail.com with subject SECURITY:.

Include:

• Affected version (release tag or commit SHA).
• Reproduction steps.
• Your assessment of impact.

Acknowledgement within 72 hours. Fix or mitigation in the next release.

Tags are annotated but not GPG-signed. Cross-check against commit SHAs from the v1.0.2 release page:

git fetch --tags
git rev-parse v1.0.2                  # 75759e819eaabd59d180459940bd542513d7daf8
git log --oneline v1.0.2 -3           # 75759e8, 1344e04, 8d4d2c1

If the SHAs don't match the release page, you have a tampered clone. Re-fetch from the canonical remote.