Please report security issues privately — do not open a public issue.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (Security → Advisories → "Report a vulnerability"). That keeps the report confidential until a fix is available.

You'll get an acknowledgement as soon as the maintainer sees it. tdoc is a solo-maintained, agent-authored project, so please allow a little time — but a real vulnerability will always take priority.

tdoc has three components worth thinking about as an attacker would:

1. The browser overlay (server/overlay.js) is bundled into the worker at publish time and runs in every reader's browser on every published doc. It renders untrusted input (comment text, author names, avatars). A way to get script execution into a reader's page (stored XSS, an injection sink, an escaping bypass) is the highest-severity class here.
2. The Cloudflare Worker (worker/worker.js) accepts untrusted request bodies (comments, reactions, uploads) and gates writes behind an upload token + GitHub sign-in. Auth bypass, injection, or a way to corrupt/forge another author's comments are in scope.
3. The CLIs (bin/tdoc-*) read your Cloudflare OAuth token from disk and call the Cloudflare API with it. They run on your machine. A way to make a CLI leak the token, run unexpected commands, or write outside its expected paths is in scope.

• Your Cloudflare token never leaves your machine except to Cloudflare. The CLIs read it locally and send it only to api.cloudflare.com. The tdoc maintainer runs no central server and never sees your token or your docs.
• You publish to your own Cloudflare Worker. Your published docs live in your account, not a shared host.
• Published docs require a one-time GitHub sign-in to comment (Device Flow, scope read:user). Local docs comment anonymously with no auth.
• Untrusted text is HTML-escaped on render — comment bodies, author names, and avatar URLs — so a comment can't inject script into the page. (If you find a case where it can, that's exactly the kind of report this policy is for.)
• Telemetry never includes your doc content, prompts, or file paths. See the Telemetry section of the README for the full field list and opt-out.

• Vulnerabilities in Cloudflare, GitHub, Node, or other upstream dependencies — report those to the respective project.
• The telemetry/ directory's Supabase edge functions (operational tooling, not part of the installed skill).
• Social-engineering, physical access, or anything requiring a already-compromised machine.

tdoc ships from main; the latest tagged release is the supported version. Fixes land on main and go out in the next release.