fix: pin 5 unpinned action(s),extract 4 unsafe expression(s) to env vars#1870
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dagecko wants to merge 1 commit intounclecode:mainfrom
Open
fix: pin 5 unpinned action(s),extract 4 unsafe expression(s) to env vars#1870dagecko wants to merge 1 commit intounclecode:mainfrom
dagecko wants to merge 1 commit intounclecode:mainfrom
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Security: Harden GitHub Actions workflows
Hey, I found some CI/CD security issues in this repo's GitHub Actions workflows. These are the same vulnerability classes that were exploited in the tj-actions/changed-files supply chain attack. I've been reviewing repos that are affected and submitting fixes where I can.
This PR applies mechanical fixes and flags anything else that needs a manual look. Happy to answer any questions.
Fixes applied
.github/workflows/docker-release.yml.github/workflows/main.yml.github/workflows/main.yml.github/workflows/release.ymlAdditional findings (manual review recommended)
| Rule | Severity | File | Description |
| RGS-004 | high |
.github/workflows/main.yml| Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check || RGS-004 | high |
.github/workflows/main.yml| Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check || RGS-004 | high |
.github/workflows/main.yml| Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check |Why this matters
GitHub Actions workflows that use untrusted input in
run:blocks or reference unpinned third-party actions are vulnerable to code injection and supply chain attacks. These are the same vulnerability classes exploited in the tj-actions/changed-files incident which compromised CI secrets across thousands of repositories.How to verify
Review the diff, each change is mechanical and preserves workflow behavior:
${{ }}expressions fromrun:blocks intoenv:mappings, preventing shell injectionIf this PR is not welcome, just close it and I won't send another.