Use constant-time comparison for passwords#31
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Description
This pull request addresses a vulnerability in the authentication process where password and hash comparisons might be vulnerable to timing attacks. The standard
==operator was replaced withsubtle.ConstantTimeCompareto ensure a constant-time comparison of secrets.The Vulnerability
When comparing
password123withpxssword123, the comparison would stop at the second character. When comparing withpassword124, it would stop at the last character.An attacker could exploit this behavior by sending slightly different passwords and measuring the server's response time. A longer response time implies that more characters in the supplied password are correct. By iteratively guessing one character at a time, an attacker could potentially reconstruct the entire password without ever knowing it beforehand.
Changes
This PR replaces comparisons with
crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare. This function always compares the full length of both byte slices, taking the same amount of time regardless of how many characters are correct.