Add post-quantum and EdDSA CRL signing

[Frauschi]

Summary

CRL signature verification already supported post-quantum algorithms: the CRL path reuses the shared ConfirmSignature() engine, which dispatches to ML-DSA / SLH-DSA / Falcon. CRL generation did not — wc_SignCRL_ex accepted only RSA and ECC keys and sized its signature buffer for a classic signature.

This PR adds wc_SignCRL_ex2, a new wolfcrypt API that signs a CRL with any supported key type, and sizes the signature buffer from the key so post-quantum signatures fit.

The new API

int wc_SignCRL_ex2(const byte* tbsBuf, int tbsSz, int sType,
                   byte* buf, word32 bufSz,
                   int keyType, void* key, WC_RNG* rng);

• Takes an untyped key plus a keyType selector, the same scheme wc_MakeCert_ex and wc_SignCert_ex use, instead of one argument per key family.
• Resolves the key and reuses the existing CheckSigTypeForKey, GetSignatureBufferSz, and MakeSignature helpers, so the signature buffer is sized from the key rather than assumed classic.
• wc_SignCRL_ex is unchanged (its original RSA/ECC signature) and becomes a thin wrapper over wc_SignCRL_ex2, so the existing public API and ABI are preserved.

Supported algorithms

Key type	CRL signing
RSA, ECC	Yes (also via the classic wc_SignCRL_ex)
Ed25519, Ed448	Yes, newly available
Falcon	Yes, newly available
ML-DSA (FIPS 204)	Yes
SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)	Yes
LMS, XMSS	Rejected with ALGO_ID_E

LMS/XMSS are intentionally rejected. They are stateful hash-based schemes; a CRL is reissued periodically and would exhaust the key's one-time signature state, with catastrophic reuse risk if that state is mismanaged.

Buffer sizing

The signature buffer is sized from the key via GetSignatureBufferSz, so large post-quantum signatures (a few KB for ML-DSA up to tens of KB for SLH-DSA) get enough room. Under WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC the signature must still fit the fixed CertSignCtx.sig buffer (tunable via WOLFSSL_MAX_SIG_SZ), consistent with the certificate signing path.

Scope and carve-outs

• OpenSSL-compat EVP layer: wolfSSL_X509_CRL_sign (the EVP_PKEY wrapper) has no PQC private-key support, so PQC CRL signing is exposed at the wolfcrypt level through wc_SignCRL_ex2. Wiring the EVP layer for PQC is a separate, larger change and is out of scope here.
• Async: wc_SignCRL_ex2 does not special-case WC_PENDING_E, mirroring the pre-existing wc_SignCRL_ex behavior. CRL signing is not async-safe; adding it would use the same guard wc_SignCert_ex already has.

Test coverage

New tests/api.c cases build a CRL, sign it with wc_SignCRL_ex2, and verify it through the certificate manager against the issuing CA:

• ML-DSA 44 / 65 / 87
• SLH-DSA SHAKE-128s (and SHA2-128s when built)
• Ed25519 and Ed448
• Negative cases:
  • tampered signature value verified as ASN_CRL_CONFIRM_E
  • sigType / key-family mismatch rejected with ALGO_ID_E
  • LMS / XMSS / XMSSMT key type rejected with ALGO_ID_E

The classic RSA/ECC path keeps its existing coverage through wc_SignCRL_ex.

[github-actions]

MemBrowse Memory Report

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-openssl-compat

• FLASH: .text +128 B (+0.0%, 771,684 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 74% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-rsa-only

• FLASH: .text +128 B (+0.0%, 325,528 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 31% used)

linuxkm-standard

• Data: __patchable_function_entries +8 B (+0.0%, 48,608 B)
  No memory changes detected for:
• gcc-arm-cortex-m0plus
• gcc-arm-cortex-m3
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-baremetal
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-crypto-only
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-dtls13
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-min-ecc
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-pkcs7
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-pq
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-sp-math
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-tls12
• gcc-arm-cortex-m4-tls13
• gcc-arm-cortex-m7
• gcc-arm-cortex-m7-pq
• gcc-arm-cortex-m7-tls13
• linuxkm-pie
• stm32-sim-stm32h753