ci: gate TA signing workflow against fork PRs#46
Open
NnnOooPppEee wants to merge 2 commits into
Open
Conversation
Add an explicit same-repo guard to the `ta` job so fork PRs cannot reach the id-token: write signing job, instead of relying on GitHub's implicit fork token downgrade. Remove the OIDC-claims and AWS_ROLE debug steps from the sign job. Refs ORBS-1702.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Pull request overview
This PR hardens the TA signing CI workflow by making the “same-repo only” boundary explicit for OIDC (id-token: write) usage, and by removing OIDC/AWS-secret diagnostic output from the signing workflow.
Changes:
- Add a job-level
ifguard indefault.yamlto skip thetareusable-workflow job for fork-basedpull_requestevents. - Remove OIDC-claims printing and AWS secret-presence echo steps from the
signjob inta.yaml.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated no comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| .github/workflows/ta.yaml | Removes OIDC/AWS debug steps from the signing job to reduce sensitive workflow instrumentation. |
| .github/workflows/default.yaml | Adds an explicit same-repo gate so fork PRs can’t invoke the OIDC-enabled TA signing workflow job. |
💡 Add Copilot custom instructions for smarter, more guided reviews. Learn how to get started.
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
tajob indefault.yamlso fork PRs cannot reach theid-token: writesigning job.Show OIDC claims (right before assume)debug step and thehas AWS_ROLE secret?echo from thesignjob inta.yaml.Why
HackerOne report #3718053 flags that the
signjob holdsid-token: writeand compiles PR-controlled code (cargo xbuilds the checked-inx/crate and anybuild.rs). It is not exploitable today because GitHub silently downgrades the forkGITHUB_TOKENto read-only, so no OIDC token is issued onpull_requestruns from forks. That protection is implicit and would break if the trigger changed topull_request_targetor the fork write-token setting were enabled. The gate makes the boundary explicit. The debug steps were trust-policy instrumentation that does not belong in a signing workflow.Linear: ORBS-1702
Test plan
tajob runs as before.tajob is skipped by theifguard.workflow_dispatch: unaffected.