Redact opaque auth/security config blobs in FTDC metadata - #4
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The FTDC metadata document (getCmdLineOpts / setParameter, and similar config
dumps in logs) carries several opaque CONFIG blobs whose values embed sensitive
infrastructure detail that the existing masking can't reach:
- oidcIdentityProviders — a stringified JSON array with the OIDC issuer,
tenant, audience and clientId
- auditLog / auditFilter — audit config that embeds users, hosts, app names
- ldapServers / ldapQueryUser / ldapBindDN, kmip*, saslauthdPath,
clusterIpSource(Allow|White)list
The obfuscator walks and masks FTDC metadata by KEY, but these values are
opaque blobs (often stringified JSON), so an unknown key holding the blob
passes through untouched — and a single-label internal hostname inside it has
no FQDN/IP/email signal for value-based detection either. Result: a real FTDC
ticket leaked a k8s hostname, an Azure AD tenant, an OIDC issuer, and audit
usernames straight through.
Redact these keys' values WHOLESALE (SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS ->
"<redacted-config>") in _obfuscate_bson_doc. These are configuration, not
metrics, so no FTDC diagnostic value is lost — the numeric setParameter tuning
the analysis relies on (e.g. storageEngineConcurrentWriteTransactions) is a
different key and is preserved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| GitGuardian id | GitGuardian status | Secret | Commit | Filename | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 34213448 | Triggered | Generic Password | 3e65b90 | mongodb_obfuscator.py | View secret |
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Problem
The FTDC metadata document (
getCmdLineOpts/setParameter, plus similar config dumps in logs) carries opaque config blobs whose values embed sensitive infrastructure detail the existing masking can't reach:oidcIdentityProviders— a stringified JSON array with the OIDC issuer, tenant, audience, clientIdauditLog/auditFilter— audit config embedding users, hosts, app namesldapServers/ldapQueryUser/ldapBindDN,kmip*,saslauthdPath,clusterIpSource(Allow|White)listThe obfuscator walks and masks FTDC metadata by key, but these values are opaque blobs (often stringified JSON), so an unknown key holding the blob passes through untouched — and a single-label internal hostname inside it has no FQDN/IP/email signal for value-based detection either.
Real-world trigger: an FTDC ticket leaked a Kubernetes hostname, an Azure AD tenant, an OIDC issuer, and audit usernames straight through, all buried in these blobs.
Fix
Redact these keys' values wholesale (
SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS→"<redacted-config>") inside_obfuscate_bson_doc.These are configuration, not metrics, so no FTDC diagnostic value is lost — the numeric
setParametertuning the analysis relies on (e.g.storageEngineConcurrentWriteTransactions) lives under different keys and is preserved. Verified: the blobs redact, embedded host/tenant/issuer/usernames are gone, FTDC still decodes, and the concurrency metric survives.Scope
Small and self-contained (19 insertions, 1 line
if→elif): only_obfuscate_bson_docchanges, gated on the new key set. Independent of #1, #2, #3.